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EQUITABLE CREDIT: APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
ACCORDING TO FAULT IN TRIPARTITE LITIGATION
UNDER THE 1972 AMENDMENTS TO THE
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
RANDALL C.

COLEMAN*
1.

and WARREN B.

DALY, JR.**

INTRODUCTION

In most industrial accident cases involving personal injury to
employees, workmen's compensation statutes require the employer to
provide the injured employee with certain designated benefits. When
the injury is caused in part by the negligence of a third party to the
employment relationship, the employer generally attempts to shift all
or part of its liability to the third party. The resultant problem of
how to apportion liability between employers and third parties has been
characterized as "[p] erhaps the most evenly -balanced controversy in
all of compensation law."' i
Longshoring2 has been one industry in which workers, despite
workmen's compensation coverage, have frequently filed third-party
actions.' In most cases, the target has been the owner of the ship on
which the longshoreman was injured. Prior to November 26, 1972,
*

Partner, Ober, Grimes & Shriver, Baltimore, Maryland; B.A., University of

Virginia, 1948; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1950.

** Associate, Ober, Grimes & Shriver, Baltimore, Maryland; B.A., Yale University, 1966; J.D., Boston University, 1974.
1. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.10, at 14-287
(1974).
2. Longshoring involves the loading and unloading of cargo ships. Workers on
the job are called longshoremen. Their employers, who in turn enter into contracts
with shipowners to provide these loading services, are called stevedoring companies,
or simply stevedores.
3. The statutory right of an injured longshoreman to sue a negligent third party
is derived from 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1970), and 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974),
amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
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the effective date of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 4 shipowners warranted the "seaworthiness" of their vessels to longshoremen performing work on board.5 When a longshoreman was injured due to unsafe
conditions aboard its vessel, the shipowner was held absolutely liable
for all proven damages.' This liability existed even though the unsafe
condition was unknown to the vessel's crew and was brought about
by a stevedoring company hired to load or unload the vessel. As a
corollary to this rule of strict liability, however, shipowners were
entitled -to indemnification from the stevedore employing the injured
longshoreman if the stevedore had breached its so-called "warranty
of workmanlike performance."' 'Courts have granted indemnity in a
wide variety of circumstances.' Thus, third-party litigation prior to
the 1972 amendments centered not on a determination of whether the
injured longshoreman could recover, but rather on who would have
to pay.
This is no longer true. Section 5 (b) of the LHWCA, added by
the 1972 amendments, states:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter
caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may
bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance
with the provisions of section 933 of this title and the employer
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. § 901-50 (1970).
5. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-98 (1946).
6. Damages were reduced by an amount equal to the percentage in which the
injured longshoreman was found to be contributorily negligent. Id. See Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), especially the concurring opinion of
Frankfurter, J., 346 U.S. at 415.
7. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124,
133-34 (1956).
8. For example, indemnity was granted when a stevedore brought into play an
unseaworthy condition of the vessel, Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358
U.S. 423 (1959), and when it non-negligently brought defective equipment on board
for use in its longshoring operations. Italia Societa per Anzioni di Navigazione v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964). Indemnification has even resulted
when a stevedore, though aware of a dangerous condition, failed to protect its employees from obvious hazards. See Brock v. Coral Drilling, Inc., 477 F.2d 211 (5th
Cir. 1973); Nicroli v. Den Norske Afrika-Og Australielinie Wilhelmsens Dampskibs-Aktieslskab, 332 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1964). For a good discussion of Sicracki,
Ryan, and their progeny see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§
6-53 to -55 (2d ed. 1975) ; Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: An Opportunity for Equitable
Uniformity in Tripartite Industrial Accident Litigation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587, 588--93
(1974); Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J.MAR. L. & CoMm. 1, 11-14 (1974).
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shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall
be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide
stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the
injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was
employed by the vessel to provide ship building or repair services,
no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the
negligence of persons engaged in providing ship building or repair services to the vessel. The liability of the vessel under this
subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness
or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy
provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies
against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.'
In post-1972 amendment cases, stevedores have been correctly
asserting that while a shipowner may be required to pay the full damages of a longshoreman injured on board its vessel as a result of the
joint negligence of stevedore and shipowner, the shipowner is precluded
by the LHWCA from obtaining indemnification. Furthermore, stevedores assert that they are still entitled to recover their compensation
liens.' 0 Thus, under the result urged by stevedores in joint-fault
situations, the entire liability for a longshoreman's injuries, including
workmen's compensation, would be shifted from stevedores to shipowners.
Neither the pre-amendment result nor the one now advanced by
stevedoring interests is satisfactory. Congress clearly outlawed indemnification, but as a consequence "the third party, who has received
no benefits from the workmen's compensation act, is forced to pay all
of the damages when normally he would ...
all ....
,1

be liable for ...

none at

Dean Prosser, in discussing the analogous topic of contribution,
criticized this all-or-nothing approach:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which
permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were
equally, unintentionally responsible, to be2 shouldered onto one

alone,

... while

the [other] goes scot free.1

The pre-amendment system of indemnification was unattractive
because, depending upon the resolution of the facts, the shipowner's
9. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
10. For a discussion of the mechanics of lien recovery see notes 228-29 and

accompanying text infra.
11. Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation
Acts, 42 VA. L. REV. 959 (1956).
12. W. PaOSsmR, THE LAW oF TORTS § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971).
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recovery against the stevedore either was for its entire liability or was
rejected in toto. Thus, a system of "sharing in the sense of dividing
the liability on some equitable basis keyed to relative fault"'" quite
clearly could not have evolved while principles of indemnity remained
firmly entrenched. The abrogation of the warranty of workmanlike
performance in longshoring personal injury cases has thus promoted
renewed interest in equitable sharing of liability between jointly negligent shipowners and stevedores. There was nothing astounding, however, in such a progression. The extension of the warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen and other harbor workers was undoubtedly
in response to the ,inequities caused by the exclusivity of workmen's
compensation benefits, which were woefully inadequate, 4 as an employee's sole remedy against his employer. Moreover, as a subsequent
quid pro quo for the shipowner's essentially strict liability, the stevedore's "obligation to indemnify '[was] based altogether upon the law's
notion -

influenced by an equitable background -

of what [was]

fair and proper between the parties.' "'
Relying on equitable principles, several recent decisions in federal
district courts have allowed plaintiff longshoremen to recover from
the shipowner only that percentage of total proven damages which
equalled the shipowner's relative fault.'" Other contrary decisions, how13. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Employer's Independent Action Against
Third Party, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223, 249 (1970).
14. The maximum weekly benefit under the LHWCA, last revised in 1961, was
seventy dollars prior to enactment of the 1972 amendments. However, the average
weekly wage of harbor workers in 1972 exceeded $200 in some ports. H.R. REP. No.
92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT], U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4698 (1972).
15. Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation
Acts, 42 VA. L. REv. 959, 960 (1956) quoting from Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130, 147 (1932). One commentator noted that:
Stevedores hold themselves out as experts in the art of ship stowage. They
are being paid to do the work efficiently, safely and in a manner so as not to visit
liability upon the shipowner. When, by the stevedore's failure to do the work in
the safe manner which he impliedly agrees, the shipowner is made to respond in
damages to the injured worker, it is but proper that the contractor make the shipowner whole. In this respect, the result achieved by Ryan is eminently fair.

M. Nomus,

THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIEs

§ 61, at 149 (2d ed. 1966).

16. Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1975 A.M.C. 1136
(D. Md. 1975); Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362
(C.D. Cal. 1974). See Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp.
1224 (D. Ore. 1975).
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ever, have held such a credit improper as disruptive of the compensation
scheme created by Congress in the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA."7
This article will analyze the application of credits in third-party
actions brought against shipowners by longshoremen and examine
their viability as permanent rules of maritime law.

II.

THE EQUITABLE CREDIT

Frascav. Prudential-GraceLines, Inc.,"s a post-amendment thirdparty action by a longshoreman against the owner of the ship on which
he was injured, gave judicial birth to the term "Equitable Credit.""
In adopting the credit, the Frasca court found a previously articulated
model, which sought to combine all the competing equities, to be
particularly pursuasive2 0 That solution, which the court believed would
"produce an equitable result in all instances,"'" contained the following
main provisions:
[1] An employee injured in the course of his employment
recovers workmen's compensation benefits from his employer,
regardless of fault. If the injury was not contributed to by the
negligence of any third party, he recovers nothing more than these
compensation benefits.
[2] If the injury was caused by the fault of a third party,
the employee may sue such third party for common law damages.
His recovery is to be reduced to the extent of his own contributory
negligence. And, if the employer was not also at fault, the full
17. Hubbard
1975); Dodge v.
1975); Lucas v.
379 F. Supp. 759

v. Great Pac. Shipping Co., Monrovia, 1975 A.M.C. 1518 (D. Ore.
Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 1975 A.MC.. 1505 (D. Ore.
"Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G.,
(E.D. Pa. 1974).

18. 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975).
19. Based upon a jury verdict finding Prudential-Grace Lines forty percent at
fault, the trial judge in Frasca held the shipowner liable to the longshoreman for
forty percent of his total damages. See Revision and Extension of Remarks by the
trial judge reported at 1975 A.M.C. 1143 (D. Md. 1975). Prudential-Grace subsequently moved for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict under FED. R. CIV.
P. 50(b). In an opinion granting that motion because "as a matter of law . . . the
shipowner breached no duty that it owed to the plaintiff," 394 F. Supp. at 1102, 1975
A.M.C. at 1142, the trial judge reiterated without further comment his previous
decision that the shipowner could only be held liable for that percentage of proven
damages which equalled his degree of fault. Id. at 1095, 1975 A.M.C. at 1131.
20. The model is set forth in Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 8, at 606-07.
21. Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1143 (D. Md. 1975),
Revision and Extension of Remarks at 1144 (D. Md. 1975).
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amount of all compensation benefits is to be deducted from the
employee's recovery and paid to the employer in reimbursement. 22
These two points cover those cases in which the third-party shipowner is either solely at fault or completely free from fault. Little
disagreement has arisen over the disposition of matters falling within
either of those categories. Consider the following facts:
Vessel's fault

0%

Stevedore's fault
Longshoreman's fault

90%
-10%0

Damages

$10,000

Compensation lien

$ 4,000

A limitation of the injured longshoreman's recovery to the $4,000 received in workmen's compensation benefits is universally conceded to
be the proper result under the LHWCA. True, the worker has been
unable to recover sixty percent of his provable damages, but such is the
23
nature of the compromise inherent in workmen's compensation acts.
The injured worker is assured his payments even in cases where his
own negligence is one hundred percent. Consider the following situation
where fault is reversed:
Vessel's fault
Stevedore's fault

Longshoreman's fault

90%
0%"

10%"

Damages

$10,000

Compensation lien

$ 4,000

It is similarly conceded that the longshoreman will recover a judgment
of $9,000 against the negligent shipowner, representing a ten percent
reduction in proven damages due to the finding, under the admiralty
concept of comparative negligence,24 that his fault contributed in causing
his injuries to that degree. From the $9,000 judgment, the longshoreman will then repay the $4,000 previously advanced by his employer
as workmen's compensation.
22. Cohen & Dougherty, slupra note 8, at 606.
23. See notes 112-24 and accompanying text infra.

24. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text infra.
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The model then suggested a more novel and daring pair of rules:
[3] If the employer was a joint tortfeasor, it could be impleaded or otherwise bound by the third party. However, in
such a case, the actual dollar liability of the employer should not
exceed the amount of the employer's dollar liability in compensation. Just as every employee will be guaranteed minimum benefits
of workmen's compensation, so will every employer be guaranteed
a maximum liability of compensation benefits, whether directly or
indirectly, for any employee's industrial accident.
The proportional amount of any employer's fault is to go in
mitigation of the third party's damages, in the same fashion as the
employee's contributory negligence, so that the third party actually
responds to the employee only for that amount of the employee's
damages as is equal to the third party's proportion of the fault.
[4] From any recovery the employee obtains from the third
party, the employee is to reimburse the employer for the compensation benefits paid. However, if any employer negligence resulted
in a diminution or reduction of the employee's recovery against
the third party, the employee may deduct and retain that amount
from the compensation benefits to be reimbursed.
Thus, if the damages attributable to the employer's fault
were less than the amount of the compensation benefits, the employer would recover only the difference between the amount of
the compensation benefits and the amount by which its fault reduced the employee's recovery. If the employer's fault were in
excess of the compensation benefits, it would not receive any
reimbursement, but neither would it be liable for any excess. In
such situation the loss to the employee is the consideration for the
absolute right to compensation benefits regardless of fault.2 5
These third and fourth points concern the controversial area of
mutual fault, in which the actions of both the shipowner and the stevedore combine in some proportion, with or without concurrence of fault
on the part of the injured longshoreman, to bring about his injuries.
Together, they are the heart of the Equitable Credit. The third "rule"
states simply that a negligent third party can only be held liable for
that portion of total proven damages which would equal his proportionate fault. The final section then provides a formula for determining
what portion of its compensation lien, if any, the stevedore or its insurance carrier would be entitled to recover in a given situation.
When the compensation lien exceeds the damages attributable to
the fault of the stevedore, none of the parties can claim to have been
25. Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 8, at 606-07.
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unfairly treated. Consider a case in which the trier of fact finds as
follows:
Vessel's fault ............ . ......................-

60 %

30%
. ........
Stevedore's fault ----------------.....
10%
Longshoreman's fault
Damages

$10,000

Compensation lien

$ 4,000

The longshoreman will be entitled to a recovery of $6,000 against the
vessel.2" Because the fault of the stevedore reduced the longshoreman's
recovery by $3,000,7 the injured worker would only be required to
repay $1,00028 of the workmen's compensation payments previously

received. The longshoreman's total recovery is therefore $9,000:
$4,000 previously received in workmen's compensation benefits plus
$5,000 remaining from his judgment against the shipowner after the
repayment of $1,000 to his employer. Because $9,000 was all that he
would have been entitled to in any event, he can not be heard to complain of any injustice. The stevedore was statutorily protected from
payment of an amount greater than its responsibility under the compensation act. However, due to a sharing of fault with the shipowner,
the stevedore has escaped with less than its full compensation liability.
Thus, the fortuitous finding of ship's negligence has provided the concurrently negligent stevedore with a $1,000 windfall.29 Obviously, the
vessel, which was sixty percent at fault, cannot complain about liability
for sixty percent of the loss.
When the damages attributable to the fault of the stevedore exceed
its compensation lien, a more difficult situation arises. Assume the
following findings:
Vessel's fault

40%

Stevedore's fault

50%

Longshoreman's fault

10%

Damages

$10,000

Compensation lien

$ 4,000

26. Sixty percent of $10,000.
27. Thirty percent of $10,000.

28. $4,000 (amount of lien) minus $3,000 (reduction in recovery due to stevedore's
fault).
29. Naturally, some stevedores will not view this situation in the same light.
Under legal principles whereby the concurrently negligent shipowner is liable for all
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The longshoreman recovers a judgment of $4,000 against the shipowner. Because the fault of the stevedore reduced the plaintiff's recovery $5,000, an amount in excess of the stevedore's compensation
lien, no repayment of the lien is required. As above, the vessel cannot
complain, for its liability is in proportion to its fault. The stevedore's
liability is limited to $4,000, the amount of payments made by it pursuant to the compensation act. Whenever damages attributable to its
fault exceed the amount of its lien, the compensation act, as applied
under the Equitable Credit, would actually reduce the stevedore's potential liability to a level beneath what it would have been were the
stevedore a joint-tortfeasor not protected by the LHWCA.80 The
injured longshoreman, however, now recovers only $8,000 - $4,000
each from the shipowner and stevedore. At first blush, it appears that
injustice has been done, for the longshoreman's recovery is now $1,000
less than he would have recovered in the absence of a compensation
statute.$' Upon reflection, though, this result is not so strange. Whenever a longshoreman is injured by the negligence of his employer and
compensation payments to him fall short of what could have been
recovered in an action at law, the same result will follow. While perhaps unjust in a given case, it again spotlights the tradeoff which is
the essence of the workmen's compensation scheme.82 In exchange for
automatic payment of compensation benefits for work-related injuries
regardless of fault, the employee gives up the possibility of an increased,
but speculative, recovery based on the employer's negligence. This
compromise has not generally been criticized. With these considerations
in mind, it would be incorrect to criticize as inequitable the result
reached through application of the Equitable Credit in cases of this
type. By receiving damages from the negligent third-party proportionate to its relative fault, the employee obtains a fuller recovery
without risking his absolute right to collect workmen's compensation
as a matter of law.
The Equitable Credit not only appears to be the fairest way of
resolving the conflicting interests of longshoremen, stevedores, and shipof the longshoreman's proven damages, reduced by his contributory negligence, the
stevedore in the hypothetical now under consideration would recover its entire lien.
Thus, argues the stevedore, application of the Equitable Credit results not in a $1,000
windfall but rather in a $3,000 loss.
30. Admiralty now allows contribution from joint tortfeasors not statutorily
immune in non-collision cases, with such contribution based upon comparative fault.
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
31. If no statute applied, the $9,000 recovery would be calculated in the same
fashion as the example at note 24 and accompanying text, supra
32. See notes 112-24 and accompanying text infra.
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owners, 33 it also provides a reciprocal device to balance the stevedore's
right to obtain recompense for its liability to an injured longshoreman
33. Not all parties with a stake in the outcome of longshoring personal injury
litigation agree that the Equitable Credit is the fairest way to resolve such conflicts.
Sage and scholarly counsel have sought out variations of the Equitable Credit which
might placate stevedoring interests and thus avoid the criticism that credits such as
the Equitable Credit merely return courts to the three-cornered litigation of preamendment days.
One proposed approach to the Equitable Credit would alter the method of

calculating the amount of lien repayment while still limiting a shipowner's liability to
that portion of total damages which equals his proportionate fault. Instead of the
Equitable Credit method of reducing the stevedore's lien recovery by the amount of
third-party damages lost by the longshoreman due to stevedore negligence, the proposal
would reduce the stevedore's lien in direct proportion to its negligence. Such an
approach was thought to be even more equitable than the Equitable Credit, while far
more appealing to stevedores and thus more likely to prevent tripartite litigation.
However, it is doubtful whether it can achieve either goal.
For the sake of analysis assume the following longshoring accident:
Longshoreman's damages $10,000
Ship's negligence -.--- 40%
Stevedore's lien --4,000
Stevedore's negligence. 609
Under the Equitable Credit, since the longshoreman's recovery of $4,000 (forty percent
of $10,000) was reduced $6,000 by the stevedore's negligence, an amount in excess of
the stevedore's lien, the longshoreman is not required to pay any of the lien. However,
under the alternate proposal, the stevedore would be precluded from recovering only
sixty percent of its lien in accordance with its degree of fault. Thus, under the two
systems, the burdens of the three parties are as follows:
,--EQUITABLE

% Fault Economic Loss
Shipowner
Stevedore
Longshoreman

CREDIT-,

-ALTERNATE

% of Loss Economic Loss

40
60
0

$ 4,000
4,000
2,000

40
40
20

$ 4,000
2,400
3,600

100

$10,000

100

$10,000

PROPOSAL--%

% of Loss
.40
16
44
100

The alternate proposal reduces the longshoreman's total recovery from $8,000 to
$6,400. Certainly it is inequitable to allow a stevedore who is already shouldering
less than his proportionate share based on fault to reduce his liability still further at
the expense of an injured longshoreman, which is precisely what the alternate proposal does. (Note that even under the Equitable Credit, the longshoreman will not
be able to recover $2,000 of his $10,000 damages. In turn, the stevedore pays only
forty percent of those damages in workmen's compensation though it is sixty percent
at fault. In any case in which the stevedore's negligence reduces the plaintiff's recovery
by more than the amount of the lien, credit defenses will cause a reduction in the
plaintiff's overall recovery. This is because, under the compromise of workmen's
compensation, discussed at notes 112-24 and accompanying text infra, the longshoreman has given up his right to collect from his employer based on fault in exchange for
the absolute right to the full coverage of workmen's compensation. We agree that
such a result is not unfair.) Viewed in terms of shipowner and stevedore, the alternative credit permits the stevedore to pay proportionately less than the shipowner,
although its fault is greater. This can be condoned when the stevedore has paid the
maximum amount of compensation available under the LHWCA, but when a stevedore recovers part of its lien under such circumstances, it is hard to see how the
admiralty principle of proportioning liability according to fault is advanced. Rather
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directly from a negligent shipowner. 4 Since a stevedore is entitled to
file suit against a third-party shipowner to recover its lien when its
liability is based, in whole or in part, on the shipowner's negligence, it
is difficult to criticize a system which seeks to protect the shipowner
from shouldering the entire liability when the loss was occasioned, in
whole or in part, by the negligence of the stevedore. At the same
than improving on the equities present under the Equitable Credit, the proposed
alternative in fact achieves just the opposite result.
The proposed change also fails to attain its objective of avoiding threecornered controversies. Any suggestion that stevedores or their compensation carriers will not feel obliged to participate if the shipowner's credit will result in a
diminution of their lien recovery only to the proportionate extent of stevedore fault
is totally unrealistic. Once a third-party action is instituted and a credit defense asserted, stevedoring interests must map their game plan. The stevedore knows that
there is some danger of its losing at least part of its lien, but it does not know how
much and will not know how much until the case has been tried. If found ninety percent at fault, the stevedore would lose ninety percent of its lien, even under the alternative proposal. Recognizing this possibility, it is hard to imagine that the application
of a percentage fault rule for reducing lien repayment would provide a stevedore much
comfort. Any stevedore willing to fight for recovery of its lien is unlikely to acquiesce
for a ten percent tidbit.
While avoidance of stevedore participation in all probability can not be
achieved by adopting the amendment to the Equitable Credit just discussed, courts
should not look adversely on the Equitable Credit even if stevedores will thus be
brought into the proceedings. Opponents of credit alternatives have argued that the
application of such alternatives will cause rifts between stevedores and longshoremen.
Admittedly, prior to the 1972 amendments, the interests of longshoremen and stevedores were usually at odds. While a stevedore might have benefited from a longshoreman's victory in the pre-amendment setting by recovering compensation extended
prior to trial, such payments were typically low under the compensation rate structure
then in existence. On the other hand, if the stevedore was found to have violated its
warranty to the shipowner of a workmanlike performance of its job, it would become
liable for the entire judgment. Thus, stevedores generally had little to gain and a great
deal to lose. Consequently, they frequently sympathized with the shipowner's efforts
to defeat the longshoreman's claim. Under the amendments, however, the stevedore's exposure is limited to its compensation payments. It can only benefit from a
longshoreman's recovery. Conversely, if the stevedore's negligence is found to be substantial, application of the Equitable Credit might cause a reduction of the longshoreman's total recovery. When the stevedore's fault exceeds its compensation exposure,
the longshoreman's total recovery will be reduced. See notes 112-24 and accompanying
text infra. Thus, if the longshoreman is not actively interested in proving an absence
of stevedore negligence, he is at worst ambivalent. No circumstances are foreseen in
which the interests of stevedore and longshoreman would be incompatible.
34. When compensation payments are accepted pursuant to an award by the
Deputy Commissioner of Workers' Compensation Programs or the Benefit Review
Board and no third-party action is brought within six months thereafter, the right to
bring such an action is automatically assigned to the employer by operation of law.
33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1970). Conversely, when payments are made voluntarily without
entry of a formal award, the employer has been held to have a common law right to
recover the amount of such payments from a negligent third-party. See Federal
Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
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time, the congressional design to limit the liability of stevedores to
the extent of their compensation payments is accomplished. 5
Thus, the Equitable Credit is deeply endowed with notions of
fundamental fairness, which should make it very appealing to courts
struggling with the problems of damage allocation in longshoring
personal injury cases. It has been urged, however, that the doctrine
is barred by various legal theories, some of which owe their inception
to the LHWCA, and some of which are creatures of the judiciary.
Before courts can, in good conscience, adopt the Equitable Credit, they
must be convinced that it is consistent with the full body of American
maritime law.

III.

APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT IN ADMIRALTY

Comparative negligence concepts are not new to federal courts
sitting in admiralty. Before the turn of the century, it was recognized
that "courts of admiralty could exercise a conscientious discretion, and
give or withhold damages upon enlarged principles of justice and
equity."" 0 From this rule, which has frequently been restated, has
evolved a "doctrine of comparative negligence. . . adopted for uniform
35. Professor Larson discussed this same problem in a non-maritime context.
2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.10. In American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d
946 (8th Cir. 1950), rev"g 81 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Iowa 1948), an employee of Armour
& Co. was injured at work by an American District Telegraph employee and received
compensation payments of $6,800. In a third-party suit against American District
Telegraph alleging damages of nearly $60,000, judgment was entered for the plaintiff
in the district court. American District Telegraph's action against Armour was dismissed, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding the concurrently negligent employer
liable to American for the damages American owed to Armour's employee.
Each side to this controversy has an argument in its favor which, considered
alone, sounds irresistible. The employer here complains with considerable cogency
that the net result is that $60,000 has been put in the employee's pocket and has
left the employer's pocket, all because of a compensable injury, in spite of the
plain statement in the act that the employer's liability for such an injury shall be
limited to compensation payments.
Yet if the third party were made to bear the entire $60,000 damages, he would
argue with equal cogency that it is unfair to subject him, the lesser of two
wrongdoers, to a staggering liability which he would not have had to bear but
for the sheer chance that the other parties involved happened to be under a compensation act. Why should he, a stranger to the compensation system, subsidize
the system by assuming liabilities that he could normally shift to or share with
the employer?
2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.10, at 14-288. Note how the arguments of both sides
succumb to an Equitable Credit analysis.
36. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 13 (1890).
37. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953).
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application in cases brought by longshoremen as well as seamen for
88
ship-board injury actions (maritime torts).P
Sharing of liability among parties whose actions have concurred
to bring about a loss has long been a rule of admiralty in collision
cases 9 In 1974, the Supreme Court extended the rule permitting
contribution among joint tortfeasors to non-collision cases in order to
ameliorate "the common-law rule against contribution which permits
a plaintiff to force one of two wrongdoers to bear the entire loss,
though the other may have been equally or more to blame." 4 The
following term, in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,4 the Court
replaced its rule of equally divided damages in collision cases with one
which apportions liability in proportion to fault. The new rule was
created ,to avoid the gross inequities frequently resulting from a system
42
in which relative fault of mutual wrongdoers is not considered.
38. Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 364 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (citations omitted).
39. See The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890) (dicta); The "North Star," 106
U.S. 17 (1882); The "Alabama" and the "Game-cock", 92 U.S. 695 (1875). See
generally Staring, Contribution and Dizision of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime
Cases, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 305 (1957).
40. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974).
41. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
42. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the unanimous Court, stated:
It is no longer apparent, if it ever was, that this solomonic division of damages serves to achieve even rough justice. An equal division of damages is a
reasonably satisfactory result only where each vessel's fault is approximately
equal and each vessel thus assumes a share of the collision damages in proportion
to its share of the blame, or where proportionate degrees of fault cannot be
measured and determined on a rational basis. The rule produces palpably unfair
results in every other case. For example, where one ship's fault in causing a
collision is relatively slight and her damages small, and where the second ship is
grossly negligent and suffers extensive damage, the first ship must still make a
substantial payment to the second. "This result hardly commends itself to the
sense of justice any more appealingly than does the common law doctrine of
contributory negligence . . . ." [G.] GiLMoRE & [C.] BLACK, [THE LAW OF
ADmmALTY] 528 [(2d ed. 1975)].
421 U.S. at 405 (footnote omitted).
It is interesting to note a recent decision involving aviation, an area closely
analogous to maritime law. Plaintiffs in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d
400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), brought an action on behalf of
one of the victims of a mid-air crash involving a small private plane and an Allegheny
commercial airliner in which the decedent had been a passenger. After deciding that
federal law applied and citing with approval Dean Prosser's criticism of rules prohibiting contribution, see note 12 and accompanying text supra, the court stated:
In our judgment the better rule is that of contribution and indemnity on a
comparative negligence basis. Under such an approach the trier of fact will determine on a percentage basis the degree of negligent involvement of each party in
the collision. The loss will then be distributed in proportion to the allocable
concurring fault.
504 F.2d at 405.
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From this whirlwind review of judicially created admiralty rules
for apportionment of damages, it is clear that division based upon comparative fault is favored and should be adopted in all cases absent
specific legislative direction to the contrary. Thus, courts faced with
claims arising under the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA should
feel free to apply any rule which equitably distributes liability and which
is not barred by the explicit wording or the legislative history of the
amendments." The report of the House Committee on Labor and Education44 clearly states the Committee's intention "that the admiralty
concept of comparative negligence, rather than the common law rule as
to contributory negligence, shall apply in cases where the injured
employee's own negligence may have contributed to causing the injury. 4' 5 Because no similar statement exists concerning those cases in
which the stevedoring employer's negligence is found to have been a
cause of the longshoreman's injury, the next inquiry must be whether
sharing of liability between stevedore and third-party shipowner was
prohibited, either expressly or impliedly, by the 1972 amendments.
It is important to understand that express congressional authority
for some system of proportionate liability is not a prerequisite for
application of the Equitable Credit. Unless prohibited by Congress,
there is ample authority for judicial adoption of the credit, notwithstanding the now somewhat outmoded language of Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,4" suggesting that such problems
await congressional action.47 In Reliable Transfer, the Supreme Court
recognized:
[t]he Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in formulating
flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime, and "Congress has
largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the
43. In a post-amendment case, one court thought it clear that "absent considerations imposed by statutes such as the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act,
admiralty courts are relatively free to fashion appropriate rules of contribution based
on fairness to the parties." Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange
G.m.B.H. & Co., K.B., 379 F. Supp. 759, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
44. HouSE REPORT, supra note 14, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong.,
at 4698. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare submitted a virtually
identical report. S. REp. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). To avoid duplication,
and in view of the fact that only the House Report is officially published, future citation
will be to the House Report only.
45. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 8. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong.,
at 4705.
46. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
47. "We have concluded that it would be unwise to fashion new judicial rules of
contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional action.
Congress has already enacted much legislation in the area of maritime personal injuries." Id. at 285.
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controlling rules of admiralty law." . . . No statutory or judicial
precept precludes a change in the rule of divided damages, and
indeed a proportional fault rule would simply bring recovery for
property damage in maritime collision cases into line with the rule
of admiralty law long since established by Congress for personal
injury cases. 48

IV.

THE

1972

AMENDMENTS

TO THE

LHWCA

The drafters of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA had two
primary goals. First, they sought to increase payments of workmen's
compensation by an amount sufficient to provide adequate replacement
for income lost due to work-related injuries. The second goal was a
realignment of the rights and liabilities of longshoremen, stevedores,
and shipowners in third-party litigation.4 9 This latter problem was
characterized as "[o]ne of the most controversial and difficult issues
which the Committee has been required to resolve." 5
It will be recalled that under judicially created doctrines shipowners
had been held absolutely liable to longshoremen injured because of
unseaworthy conditions aboard their ships, but that such shipowners
later became entitled to complete indemnity from the stevedoring company when the injury was, in whole or in part, due to a breach of the
stevedore's "warranty of workmanlike performance."'" Testimony before congressional committees considering proposed amendments to
the LHWCA disclosed that this third-party litigation was becoming
very costly and suggested that funds spent on litigation "could better
be utilized to pay improved compensation benefits." 5 2 To deal with the
third-party problem, Congress in 1972 added section 5(b) to the
48. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975), quoting
from Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (citations omitted).
The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), adopts FELA standards mandating proportional fault in personal injury cases. Relevant FELA standards can be found at 45
U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
49. HouSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-2, 4-8, U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
92d Cong., at 4698-99.
50. Id. at 4, U.S. CODE Co NG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong., at 4701.
51. See notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra.
52. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5, U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws, 92d Cong.,
at 4702. The Committee Report further stated:
Industry witnesses testified that despite the fact that since 1961 injury frequency
rates have decreased in the industry, and maximum benefits payable under the
Act have remained constant, the cost of compensation insurance for longshoremen
has increased significantly because of the increased number of third party cases
and legal expenses and higher recoveries in such cases. The Committee also heard
testimony that in some cases workers were being encouraged not to file claims for
compensation or to delay their return to work in the hope of increasing their
possible recovery in a third party action.
Id. at 5, U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong., at 4702-03.
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LHWCA, 53 thereby eliminating the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen. Furthermore, because the shipowner's
liability could now be based only on his negligence, Congress found it
54
appropriate to prohibit indemnity, whether contractual or implied.
As before, the employee's workmen's compensation benefits would remain his exclusive remedy against his employer.
While the abrogation of warranties of seaworthiness and indemnity
are very clearly stated, section 5(b) failed to clarify the manner in
which damages should be apportioned in cases in which concurring
negligence of a shipowner and a stevedore combined to cause an injury
to a longshoreman. While it may be argued that the exclusivity language of section 5 (a) of the LHWCA 55 forbids any apportionment, it
appears unlikely that the Congress could have intended such a result.58
Section 5 (a) states:
The liability of an employer prescribed [in the LHWCA]
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife,
parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty
on account of such injury or death . . ..
The argument advanced is that a shipowner seeking apportionment of
damages falls into the category of "anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages" and that such apportionment is therefore statutorily barred.
53. Section 5(b) of the 1972 amendment is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp.
IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970), and is set out in the text accompanying
note 9 supra.
54. For a review of the impact one author believes the 1972 amendments will have
on pre-amendment concepts of unseaworthiness and indemnity see Gorman, supra
note 8, at 14-22.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), formerly 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
56. The late Professor Hart and Professor Sacks noted the absurdity of assigning
to Congress such an intent.
The national legislature, we are asked to suppose, made a deliberate decision
that the third person - when there was one - should be left holding the bag for
both employer and employee. In pursuance of a Congressional purpose to sweeten
up the quid pro quo even for negligent employers, the third person was to he
deprived of the right of contribution which the principles of the preexisting
general law plainly gave him, with no quid in return for his quo whatever. And
this was to be accomplished, inter alia, by presenting the legal world with the theretofore unheard of spectacle of a negligent plaintiff recovering from his co-tortfeasor
not merely half his damages but the whole of them - on the excuse that a surplus might be produced which would benefit the plaintiff's employee. The third
person unfortunate enough to injure a beneficiary of a compensation act, in other
words, was to be the gratuitous statutory indemnitor of the beneficiary's wrongdoing employer.
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LE.AL PRocEss 529 (1958).
57. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis added).

19761

THE EQUITABLE CREDIT

That analysis, however, is contrary to the language and reasoning of
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.58
In Ryan, an injured longshoreman had received compensation
benefits from Ryan, his employer, and then brought a third-party action
against Pan-Atlantic, owner of the vessel on which he was injured. The
shipowner then sought indemnity from Ryan, the stevedoring employer.
Judgment was entered for the longshoreman and, after appeal, PanAtlantic was granted indemnity from Ryan, whose defense centered
around the exclusivity provision -identical to the present provision which was then in effect.59 The Court found that:
The obvious purpose of this provision is to make the statutory
liability of an employer to contribute to its employee's compensation the exclusive liability of such employer to its employee, or to
anyone claiming under or through such employee, on account of
his injury or death arising out of that employment. In return, the
employee, and those claiming under or through him, are given a
substantial quid pro quo in the form of an assured compensation,
regardless of fault, as a substitute for their excluded claims. On
the other hand, the Act prescribes no quid pro quo for a shipowner
that is compelled to pay a judgment obtained against it for the
full amount of a longshoreman's damages.
Section 5 of the Act expressly excludes the liability of the
employer "to the employee," or others, entitled to recover "on
account of such [employee's] injury or death." Therefore, in the
instant case, it excludes the liability of the stevedoring contractor
,to its longshoreman, and to his kin, for damages on account of the
longshoreman's injuries. At the same time, however, [section] 5
expressly preserves to each employee a right to recover damages
against third persons. It thus preserves the right which [the
longshoreman] has exercised, to recover damages from the shipowner in the present case. The Act nowhere expressly excludes
or limits a shipowner's right, as a third person, to insure itself
against such a liability either by a bond of indemnity, or the
contractor's own agreement to save the shipowner harmless."0
Thus, applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the phrase "anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer" in section
5(a) means only those persons "claiming under or through such
employee."'" Those persons, however, unlike shipowners, were given a
quid pro quo for insertion of an exclusivity provision in the LHWCA.
In allowing indemnity in Ryan, the Court emphasized that because
the shipowner's cause of action against the independent stevedoring com58.
59.
60.
61.

350 U.S. 124 (1956).
33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. IV, 1974).
350 U.S. at 129-30 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 129. Contra, 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-308 to -309.
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pany was based on breach of their contractual relations, the remedy
was clearly not barred by the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA
which precluded only those claims directly on account of injury to a
longshoreman arising out of his employment. 2 However, nothing in
Ryan suggests that a different result would have been reached in the
absence of a contractual relationship.' When a stevedore's wrong
causes injury to another, it is illogical to provide a remedy if the duty
breached was contractual in nature, but not if it violated principles of
4
tort.

Thus, because the language of section 5 (a), unchanged since Ryan,
does not preclude apportionment of fault between negligent shipowners
and stevedores, any statutory exclusion must be found in section 5 (b) ,65
added by the 1972 amendments. However, rather than directing shipowners to pay all proven damages, a close analysis of the first three
sentences of section 5(b) uncovers strong evidence that shipowners
are to be held liable only for those damages chargeable to their own
negligence.
The first sentence creates a general right of recovery "[ifn the
event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel."6 6 The second and third sentences, covering
workers who were "employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring
services [or] .

.

. ship building or repair services," '

qualify the avail-

ability of that remedy when no independent stevedoring contractor is
employed, but rather longshoremen are hired directly by the shipowner.
Such shipowners are considered to function in two entirely different
capacities, retaining immunity from third-party actions in favor of
compensation liability when supervising and conducting longshoring
operations, but also remaining subject to suit whenever actions of
the ship's crew are identified as causing injury to a longshoreman. To
62. 350 U.S. at 130.
63. The Ryan Court noted in passing that it need not reach that issue. Id. at
132 n.6.
64. The difference between contract and tort remedies is largely historical.
Moreover, if the contractual indemnity in Ryan was not, as the Court found, "on
account of such injury," then a similar indemnity based on tort would be similarly
beyond the reach of the LHWCA's exclusivity provision. Just as the stevedore's
failure to perform its job in a workmanlike manner, causing the shipowner to pay
damages to its employee, is not technically an injury to the employee, so also a
negligent act of the stevedore causing similar liability to fall upon the shipowner
cannot be considered an injury only to the employee, but rather an injury directly to
the shipowner as well.
65. Set out in full in text accompanying note 9 supra.
66. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
67. Id.
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ensure retention of the immunity, a negative clause was inserted in
section 5(b): "[N]o such action shall be permitted if the injury was
caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring
services to the vessel." 6
While at first glance no inconsistencies are apparent in the first
three sentences of section 5(b), an absurd anomaly arises if the word
"negligence" as used in the first and third sentences is construed as
meaning any negligence whatsoever.6 9 An employee of an independent
stevedoring contractor will recover his full damages from a negligent
shipowner under the first sentence, even though the ship's fault was
only a one percent factor in causing the accident and the negligence of
his employer was ninety-nine percent responsible. However, if the
longshoreman is hired directly by the shipowner, the third sentence
would deny him any recovery whenever persons involved in doing the
stevedoring work commit as little as one percent of the negligence,
despite the fact that the negligence of the ship's crew might have been
ninety-nine percent responsible for his injuries. Obviously, this result
could not have been intended by the Congress.
Because a literal reading of section 5(b) creates irreconcilable
conflict if the word "negligence" is understood to mean any negligence
at all, some alternative meaning which harmonizes the section must be
adopted. This is simply and effectively achieved if "negligence," as
used in section 5 (b), is recognized as contemplating the extent of fault
in addition to its threshold existence. Thus, the first sentence creates a
right of recovery for injuries received to the extent such injuries were
caused by the vessel, and the third sentence limits the recovery of
longshoremen hired directly by the vessel only by the extent that their
fellow workers caused the injury. Thus viewed, section 5(b) is internally consistent and in accord with the general principles of maritime
law.7"
Despite the fact that, under close analysis, section 5 now appears
to compel application of an equitable-type credit, it is nonetheless true
that express language in the LHWCA, as amended, neither prohibits
nor approves such a credit. Consequently, the next step involves an
examination of the legislative history to the 1972 amendments. Both
the House of Representatives and the Senate held a series of hearings
on several bills then pending to amend the LHWCA. 71 Subsequently,
68. Id.
69. When the same word appears twice in any portion of a statute, it is presumed
that an identical meaning was intended to attach to those words. See Atlantic Cleaners
& Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932); Meyer v. United States, 175
F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1949).
70. See text accompanying notes 36-48 supra.
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Committee Reports were issued,7 2 and the bills reported out were
adopted.7"
Two of the bills under consideration, H.R. 35057" and S. 52575
sought to eliminate the third-party difficulties by defining "employer"
to include the vessels on which longshoring work was being conducted.
These bills would thus have immunized shipowners from suit by making
the payment of workmen's compensation benefits the exclusive remedy
of the injured longshoremen against both the stevedore and the shipowner. Naturally these bills were strenuously opposed by representatives of the longshoremen, 76 who lobbied for a bill which would have
allowed injured longshoremen to recover from shipowners based upon
the unseaworthiness of their vessel, but would have denied the shipowner any right of indemnity against the employing stevedore. Needless to say, shipowners found this suggested solution to be totally
unacceptable. Thus, a polarity of interests formed on the third-party
question which threatened to prevent adoption of any bill despite the
general feeling that some sort of change was long overdue.
While both sides emphasized the benefits that would be achieved
should their views be accepted, it was obvious that they foresaw the
likelihood of a compromise solution. Sprinkled throughout the hearings are isolated indications that some give and take between shipowners
and stevedores had been contemplated. Ralph M. Hartman,7 7 testifying
in favor of retention of an injured longshoreman's right to bring a
third-party action against a shipowner, suggested that "[t]o abrogate
71. Hearings on H.R. 247, H.R. 3505, H.R. 12006 and H.R. 15023 Before the
Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525,
and S. 1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
72. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
73. Senate Bill 2318 was reported by the Senate Subcommittee on Labor on
Aug. 17, 1972, reported by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on
Sept. 13, 1972, 118 CONG. REc. 30397 (1972), and considered and passed by the Senate
on Sept. 14, 1972. 118 CoNG. Rc. 30674 (1972). H.R. 12006 was discharged from
the House Select Subcommittee on Labor and approved by the House Committee on
Education and Labor on Sept. 25, 1972. 118 CONG. REc. 32023 (1972). In lieu of H.R.
12006, the House considered and passed a slightly amended version of S. 2318 on
Oct. 14, 1972, 118 CONG. REc. 36388 (1972), with which the Senate concurred.
74. H.R. 3505, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See discussion in House Hearings,
supra note 71, at 12-13.
75. S. 525, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See discussion in Senate Hearings,
supra note 71, at 13-15.
76. See Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co.,
K.G., 379 F. Supp. 759, 767 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
77. Assistant Manager, Safety and Workmen's Compensation Division, Bethlehem
Steel Corp., representing the Shipbuilders Council of America. House Hearings, supra
note 71, at 65.
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this right, without the longshoremen or ship repair yard workers
receiving a quid pro quo from the responsible third party, would ...
be morally wrong and [might] raise a question of possible violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution. 7' 7 This analysis, however,
suggests a difficulty with any denial of apportioned liability between
shipowner and stevedore. Borrowing Mr. Hartman's words, "to abrogate [the right of apportioned damages], without [the shipowner]
receiving a quid pro quo from the responsible [stevedore], would be
wrong."
Attorneys who had frequently represented injured longshoremen
believed that apportioned damages were eminently fair. John R.
Martzell79 remarked that, in mutual fault cases, shipowners would only
"be responsible for anything in excess of the Longshoremen's and
Harborworkers Act benefits."' He viewed this solution as a good one
because it limited employers to liability for compensation while pro82
viding some relief against negligent shipowners.8 1 David B. Kaplan,
while advocating retention of the warranty of seaworthiness, nonetheless
believed that the relative liability of shipowner and stevedore would
most equitably be determined under notions of comparative negligence,88
whereby eachwould "bear its rightful share of the total 'misery cost.' 84
It appears that Senator Javits approved of a limited negligence remedy
against shipowners. Discussing such a proposal with Secretary of
Labor Hodgson, the Senator stated: "There would be no diminution
of the negligence from one employer to the other, but you would still
attain some penalty, as it were, for negligence which caused injuries . *...
,,5 The committee reports, while clearly indicating congressional intent in many areas not made expressly clear by the amendments themselves, do not shed a great deal of light on the proper
procedure for apportioning damages in mutual fault cases. After
eliminating the right of longshoremen to sue for unseaworthiness, the
House Report continued:
Thus a vessel shall not be liable in damages for acts or omissions
of stevedores or employees of stevedores subject to this Act ...
78. House Hearings,supranote 71, at 71.
79. President, Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association. House Hearings, supra

note 71, at 153.
80. Id. at 157.
81. Id.

82. Chairman of the Admiralty Section of the American Trial Lawyers Association. House Hearings,supra note 71, at 133.
83.
note 71,
84.
85.

Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 354-55, 373, 377. House Hearings, supra
at 136-37.
Senate Hearings,supra note 71, at 377.
Id. at 38.
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for the manner or method in which stevedores or employees of
stevedores subject to this Act perform their work

. . .

for gear or

equipment of stevedores or employees of stevedores subject to this
Act whether used aboard ship, or ashore . . . or for other cate-

gories of unseaworthiness which have been judicially established."'
The Report posited an example and reaffirmed that the "vessel [would]
not be chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore or employees of
the stevedore. ' 87 It is not clear whether Congress intended this language
to apply to joint fault situations. Certainly, however, if Congress had
intended that the vessel owner be found one hundred percent responsible
when stevedore negligence contributed to the accident, the Committee
could very well have said in its Report that the vessel would not be
charged with the sole negligence of the stevedore.8 "Indemnity (or warranty) language is no longer permissible under § 905(b). But if the
Congress really meant that the 1% negligent shipowner should pay
full damages to the injured worker and recover nothing from the 99%
negligent employer, it might have said so more clearly. '8 9 Unfortunately, the brief floor debate provides no guidance. 90
Additionally, compounding the difficulties of determining congressional intent is an unexplained gap in the legislative 'history. The
compromise bill reported out of committee was significantly different
from any of the bills under consideration during the subcommittee
hearing with regard to third-party practice. This gap was bridged
during a meeting, attended by representatives of all interested factions,
which had been called in the hope that a last-minute compromise could
be worked out, thereby enabling passage of the amendments before the
92d Congress was adjourned. 9 Many narrow issues were discussed
86. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
at 4703-04.
87. Id. at 7, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong., at 4704.

NEWS,

92d Cong.,

88. The failure of Congress to add a similar word was found by one court to be a
persuasive reason for adopting a certain interpretation of the amendments in an
analogous situation. The shipowner in Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz
Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974), had argued that it
could not be held liable unless the accident was caused by its sole negligence. The
court very properly held that if Congress had intended such a result, it had only to
insert the word "solely" in the first sentence of section 905 (b). Id. at 769. Similarly,
the Second Circuit rejected a shipowner's argument that it could only be held liable
if found to be solely responsible for the accident by noting that Congress could easily
have phrased section 905(b) to provide a remedy for injuries "caused by the 'sole'
negligence of the vessel." Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 763 (2d Cir. 1975).
89. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, § 6-57, at 452.
90. 118 CONG. REC. 36380-88 (1972) (debate on H.R. 12006); 118 CONG. Rac.
36270-74 (1972) (debate in Senate on House amendments to S. 2318). See note
73 supra.
91. Letters from Eugene Mittelman of December 12, 1975 and E.D. Vickery of
October 29, 1975 to the authors, on file at the Maryland Law Review. Mr. Mittelman
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at the meeting, including among them the question of apportionment
of loss where the fault of both the third-party shipowner and the
employer-stevedore combined to cause injury to a longshoreman.
Several formulas were advanced, but resolution of the problem could
not be achieved in the time available. Ultimately, solution of the
question was left to the courts.92
In construing legislation, the temptation is great to read into
general language answers to a myriad of specific problems not expressly
dealt with by the statute. The question with which this article deals is
very precise:
[D] id the compensation acts, in conferring immunity on the employer from common-law suits, mean to do so only at the expense
of the injured employee, or also at the expense of outsiders? One
answer is that the injured employee got quid pro quo, in receiving
assured compensation payments as a substitute for tort recoveries,
while the third party has received absolutely nothing, and hence
should not be impliedly held to have given up rights which he had
before. It is unfair, so the argument runs, to pull the third party
within the principle of mutual sacrifice when his part is to be all
sacrifice and no corresponding gain.93
Although it is true that shipowners did benefit from abrogation
of the warranty of seaworthiness previously owed to longshoremen,
such benefits only partially balanced the scale. Termination of the
seaworthiness warranty was balanced by an end to indemnity. While
the shipowner could no longer pass on damages due to unsafe conditions created by the stevedore, neither could it be liable for them
initially. However, the shipowner is now asked to assume complete
responsibility for damages caused by the stevedore whenever it contributes to those damages in any degree. For this added exposure, which
would not exist in the absence of the compensation act, the shipowner
has received no quid pro quo.
Congress does not necessarily intend to answer all foreseeable
questions whenever it gives its approval to new legislation. In fact, it
frequently legislates only to the extent required to solve a given problem
or correct a particular injustice. This is in keeping with the general
served as Minority Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Labor which conducted
hearings on the 1972 amendments and was himself an active participant in drafting
the Committee Reports. Mr. Vickery is an attorney in Houston who represented the
National Maritime Compensation Commission. They both attended the compromise
meeting, which lasted well into the early morning, along with representatives of the
congressional committees considering the bills, the Department of Labor, stevedores,
shipowners, and labor unions representing longshoremen.
92. Id.
93. 2 A. LAusoN, supra note 1, § 76.52, at 14-407.
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interstitial nature of legislative proceedings."' Courts, rather than redundantly inquiring as to what Congress intended in a given situation,
must consider two other alternatives: that Congress either did not
consider that situation at all or intentionally chose not to offer a
solution, leaving the matter for judicial resolution. " That does not
mean, however, that the courts should not be guided in part by those
clear expressions of congressional intent which have relevance to the
question under consideration.9"
One clear purpose of the amendments was "to insulate the longshoreman's and harbor worker's employer from any liability other than
that provided by the Act."' 97 The whole package, however, was viewed
by the Congress as an equitable solution to the problems of protecting
longshoremen and harbor workers.9 When one statute attempts ta
achieve a variety of goals and -its legislative history suggests varying
guidelines for achieving those goals, conflicts are inevitable.99 In re94. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
470-71 (2d ed. 1973).
95. An example of judicial reluctance to decide independently questions peripheral'
to legislation is found in the post-amendment case of Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts.
Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974):
[T]here are numerous solutions possible in determining how to spread liability
among joint tortfeasors with each solution having the common denominator, so it
is contended, of fairness. Regardless of what our feelings may be, however, we
are bound in the cases before us by Congress' policy determination.
Id. at 766 (footnote omitted).
96. For this reason, judicial solutions which contravene stated congressional goals.
must be rejected. Id. at 769.
97. See id. at 767.
98. Speaking on the floor of the House, Representative Quie of Minnesota, a member of the Committee on Education and Labor which had considered the amendments,
stated, "It seems to me, with this problem having faced us so long, this committee
came out with an equitable solution that we should go with . . . ." 118 CONG. REc.
36386 (1972). Representative Esch of Michigan, a member of both the Committee on
Education and Labor and the Select Subcommittee on Labor, added his view that
"it is fair to all who are most vitally and materially concerned. It corrects longstanding inadequacies and inequities. In fact, it is so good a bill that it might well
serve in many respects as a model for other public agencies that deal with workmen's
compensation." Id. at 36388.
99. The legislative history, for example, states that "where a longshoreman or
other worker covered under this Act is injured through the fault of the vessel, the
vessel should be liable for damages as a third party, just as land-based third parties
in non-maritime pursuits are liable for damages when, through their fault, a worker
is injured." HouSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d
Cong., at 4702. The Report later states, however, that a uniform body of federal law
is to be formulated, as "the Committee does not intend that the negligence remedy
authorized in the bill shall be applied differently in different ports depending on the
law of the State in which the port may be located." Id. at 8, U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, 92d Cong., at 4705. When considering how to apportion liability in joint
fault situations, the wide variety of rules used in different jurisdictions (see notes
SYSTEM
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solving conflicts within the LHWCA, reliance must be placed upon
the wisdom of courts to "draw some guidelines to reconcile the Congressional purpose with the equitable principles applicable to admiralty
practice."' ° The Equitable Credit contains just such guidelines.
V.

A.

SUPPORT

FOR THE EQUITABLE CREDIT

Apportionment of Damages in Previous Compensation Cases

In an attempt to prevent courts from awarding to shipowners
equitable credits against favorable plaintiffs' verdicts, longshoremen
and other harbor workers may well assert their right at common law
to collect all provable damages from a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor without regard to the right of such tortfeasor to contribution
or indemnity. Because the right of harbor workers to bring an action
against shipowners in admiralty for negligence has evolved from
common law rights of action, this argument may appear persuasive to
some courts.
There are two answers to this argument. The first, though perhaps
somewhat superficial, is that a shipowner found negligent in a thirdparty action is not actually jointly and severally liable with the stevedore,
whose liability is statutorily limited to payment of workmen's compensation.'
Secondly, this is not a normal tort action at common law.
Although the liability of each party may be determined largely under
common law principles, it cannot be forgotten that such a third-party
suit is the final function of a legislative scheme for the protection of
injured workers. All that transpires must be considered in that light.
It is therefore important to understand fully the nature and purposes
of workmen's compensation systems.
1.

The Basic Nature of Workmen's Compensation
Workmen's compensation, it must be initially understood, is

not based upon principles of tort law. 02 To the contrary, "the right
125-34 and accompanying text infra), makes these two goals irreconcilable. Consequently it has been suggested:
If the lawsuit should arise from a maritime accident, it is useless for Congress to
talk about having it identical to the situation that would prevail in a non-maritime
(non-federal) accident, and for such pattern to be uniform throughout the country.
Things equal to unequal things are never equal to each other.
Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 8, at 605.
100. Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 367 (C.D.
Cal. 1974).
101. See notes 213-17 and accompanying text infra.
102. It has been asserted, "Almost every major error that can be observed in the
development of compensation law, whether judicial or legislative, can be traced . . . to
the importation of tort ideas .... " 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.20, at 2-3.
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to benefits and amount of benefits are based largely on a social theory
of providing support and preventing destitution, rather than settling
accounts between two individuals according to their personal deserts
or blame."' 0 3 Since its inception in Europe in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, the idea of workmen's compensation spread quite
rapidly and now, after a somewhat shaky beginning, compensation
statutes are in effect throughout the United States.'
The basic theory of workmen's compensation is best characterized
by an old campaign slogan, "the cost of the product should bear the
blood of the workmen."' 1 5 In addition to passing on the cost of these
injuries to the consumer, compensation statutes have also proved beneficial to injured workers by speeding their relief and helping to reduce
friction with their employers.'0 6 Financially, the goal of compensation
statutes is income replacement.10 7 To accomplish this, the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA set the level of payments for total disability,
whether temporary or permanent, at two-thirds of the worker's average
weekly wage, but not to exceed 200 percent of the national average
weekly wage for longshoremen and harbor workers. 08 Because the
compensation benefits are non-taxable, most workers will receive nearly
103. Id. at 2.
104. See Boals, The Trouble with Workmen's Compensation in Tennessee, 38
TENN. L. REv. 517, 518 (1971).
105. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 80, at 530 (original source of slogan unknown).
Dean Prosser went on to say:
The human accident losses of modern industry are to be treated as a cost of production, like the breakage of tools or machinery. The financial burden is lifted
from the shoulders of the employee, and placed upon the employer, who is expected to add it to his costs, and so transfer it to the consumer.
Id. at 530-31. Professor Larson has stated:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the
wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form,
financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an
enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less
satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most
appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the product.
I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.20, at 5. See Atleson, Workmen's Compensation:
Third Party Actions and the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 515,
516 (1970).
106. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 80, at 531.
107. This was a specifically stated goal of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA.
See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 1, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong.,
at 4698-99.
108. Id. at 2-3, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong., at 4700. Under this
formulation, it was expected that ninety percent of all covered harbor workers would
be entitled to recover two-thirds of their normal pay in the event of a work-rclated
injury which prevented them from working.
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the same take-home pay while on compensation as they received on
the job. 10 9
Once lost income is replaced, however, the goals of workmen's
compensation are not at an end. Indeed,
every mature loss-adjusting mechanism must look in two directions: it must make the injured person whole, and it must also
seek out the true wrongdoer whenever possible. While compensation law, in its social legislation aspect, is almost entirely preoccupied with the former function, it is not so devoid of moral
content as to overlook the latter. It should never be forgotten that
the distortions of our old-fashion fault concepts that have been
thought advisable for reasons of social policy are exclusively
limited to providing an assured recovery for the injured person;
they have never gone on - once the injured person was made
whole - to change the rules on how the ultimate burden was
borne." 0
Concepts of fault should thus be considered once the automatic payment
of benefits of the injured worker has been assured."'
2.

The Compromise Inherent in Workmen's Compensation

In protecting injured workers, the compensation statutes strike a
compromise
by which the workman is to accept a limited compensation, usually
less than the estimate which a jury might place upon his damages,
in return for an extended liability of the employer, and an assurance
that he will be paid. Accordingly, even though his damages are
partly of a nature not compensated under the act, he 2has no cause
of action based on the negligence of his employer."
109. In the case of some highly paid workers, compensation benefits may even
exceed normal take-home pay. See Statement of the American Mutual Insurance
Alliance, Senate Hearings,supra note 71, at 234, 236.
110. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 71.10, at 14-1.
111. Id. at 14-2.
112. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 80, at 531-32 (footnote omitted). See 2 A.
LARSON, supra note 1, at § 65.10. Secretary of Labor Hodgson discussed this compromise during his testimony before the congressional subcommittees considering the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA. House Hearings, supra note 71, at 47; Senate
Hearings, supra note 71, at 29. See also Bernstein, The Need for Reconsidering the
Role of Workmen's Compensation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 992, 993 (1971) ; Boals, supra
note 104, at 518-19; Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party Action
Against A Virginia Employer in Tort, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 159 (1974) ; Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L.

REV. 959, 961 (1956).

Examples of damages not compensated under the LHWCA

include pain and suffering, injury to sexual organs or capacity, and disfigurement short
of that affecting employability. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 65.20. Such
losses are non-compensable because they do not affect a workers wage-earning capacity.
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While compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy of an injured
worker against his employer, they do not bar him from bringing an
action against a third-party responsible, in some degree, for his injuries.
The employer has assumed strict liability in exchange for limited
exposure; the third-party, on the other hand, has sacrificed nothing."'
It is important, however, to understand exactly what portion of
his cause of action an injured worker has given up in exchange for
workmen's compensation. Failure to differentiate elements of a worker's
claim could easily result in a double recovery contrary to the intent
of the compensation system. 11 4 In the absence of a compensation
statute, an injured worker would be entitled to sue any party whose
negligence was a cause of his injuries. If the negligence of two or
more parties combined to cause his injury, he could join them in one
action or proceed independently against any one of them. In the latter
situation, however, the defendant could obtain contribution from the
other tortfeasors in proportion to their responsibility for the loss."'
In the longshoring situation, the two tortfeasors would normally be the
shipowner and the stevedore who employed the injured man. If no
compensation act were present to modify the rights and liabilities of
those parties, a shipowner held liable to an injured longshoreman would
thus be entitled to contribution, from a concurrently negligent stevedore,
in an amount determined by their relative fault. The LHWCA, however, has prohibited direct actions by longshoremen against their employers since its creation in 1927. Because the Supreme Court had
prohibited contribution in longshoring cases," 6 an inequitable situation
arose. Longshoremen could only sue shipowners, who were then
unable to obtain any contribution, even when the stevedore's fault
greatly exceeded that of the vessel. It was in answer to this problem
that the Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship
Corp." ' created the stevedore's implied warranty of workmanlike performance. After Ryan, if conduct of the stevedore sufficient to breach
the warranty were a cause of the longshoreman's injury, the entire
burden of meeting damages would be shifted to the stevedore even if
the fault of the shipowner was also substantial."" Thus, one unfair
solution was replaced by another.
113. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 71.20, at 14-3.
114. See United States Lines Co. v. Jarka Corp., 265 F. Supp. 811, 815 (D. Mass.),
modified, 387 F.2d 436, 437 (1st Cir. 1967).
115. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 11012 (1974).
116. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1951).
117. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
118. The stevedore could avoid indemnification only if the negligent conduct of
the shipowner precluded the stevedore from performing its job in a workmanlike
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It is in the light of these developments that one must consider the
meaning of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA and the recent
decision in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.," 9 which accorded a general right to obtain contribution from joint tortfeasors.
If injured by the mutual fault of a shipowner and a stevedore, a person
not in the employ of either could bring an action against either or both
for all of his provable damages. If only one were sued, it could obtain
contribution from the other. Thus, each would pay its share of the
whole. When the injured man is an employee of the stevedore, however, the LHWCA enters the picture. Because "between an employer
and its injured employee, the right to compensation under the Act
should be the employee's exclusive remedy,"' 2 ° the longshoreman cannot obtain that portion of his proven damages at law caused by his
employer's negligence directly from the stevedore. He must recover
them from the shipowner or not at all. Note, however, that if the
longshoreman is permitted to recover both his compensation and damages at law in excess of those allocable to the negligence of parties other
than his employer, he will have obtained a double recovery. Double
recoveries have been avoided all along by repaying the stevedore's
compensation lien out of the damages recovered at law. In that case,
however, the stevedore, rather than paying compensation instead of
damages, pays nothing at all. The obvious equitable way to avoid
such a result is not to use the damages allocable -to the stevedore's fault
-to repay the lien of the negligent employer, but rather to reduce the
liability of third parties to their fair share based on relative fault. In
effect, the longshoreman would be giving up that portion of his potential
recovery at law caused by the negligence of his employer in exchange
for an absolute right to receive compensation benefits. This is simply
another way of restating the operation of the Equitable Credit.
Consider the following examples:
B
A
Fault
Vessel ..... .............................0%
0%
Stevedore

Longshoreman

-----------

-----------------

100%

0%

0%

100%

In both cases, assume damages of $10,000 and a compensation lien
of $4,000. In A and B, the result would be identical. When only -the
longshoreman and/or the stevedore are at fault, the longshoreman's
manner. See Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S.

563 (1958).
119. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
120. Id. at 113.
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recovery is limited to compensation payable under the statute. In both
cases he receives $6,000 less than the damages which could have been
proven in court, but in only one case is he considered a loser. In A
he could have recovered the full $10,000 had he been entitled to sue
his employer; in B he would have recovered nothing. This illustrates
the compromise of workmen's compensation.
Now alter the facts as follows:
A,
Bi
Fault
Vessel ---.-.--------.......--------------- 50%

Stevedore ------------------Longshoreman -------- ----

50
0%

50%

0
50%

Again, assume damages of $10,000 and a $4,000 compensation lien.
By making the third party fifty percent at fault in each of the situations
considered above, an anomaly arises. In B1, the longshoreman recovers
$5,000 from the vessel, 12 ' but is required to repay $4,000 to the blameless stevedore. Thus, his real recovery increases only $1,000. In A,,
however, under a non-credit approach, the recovery from the vessel
would be $10,000, of which $4,000 would again be repaid to the stevedore. In both cases, the vessel is fifty percent at fault, but due to the
fortuitous circumstance in A, that the stevedore, rather than the injured
longshoreman, was the other negligent party, the shipowner is required
to pay double damages, in effect absolving the negligent stevedore at
little gain to the longshoreman. Under the Equitable Credit analysis,
the longshoreman in A, would recover only $5,000 from the vessel, but
would not be required to repay the stevedore's lien of $4,000,122 yielding
a net recovery of $9,000. In A, the longshoreman suffered a loss of
$6,000 due to the compensation statute. In A,, because he can bring
an action against the vessel, he is able to recover $5,000 of that loss.
It is illogical, however, to assert that the chance appearance on the
scene of a third-party tortfeasor should enable an injured longshoreman
to recover damages resulting from his employer's negligence which
would otherwise be barred by the compensation statute.
Situations like the ones discussed above, in which either the longshoreman or the stevedore is negligent, but not both, pose a difficult
problem for courts not applying an Equitable Credit.
[B]oth the employer and the employee normally profit by a
successful recovery against the third party. If one is innocent and
the other guilty of negligence, the award of damages has the effect
121. $10,000 reduced by fifty percent because of the worker's contributory fault.
122. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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of rewarding the guilty; but a denial of damages has the equally
unfair effect of penalizing the innocent. Since the cause of action
cannot be split, a choice must be made between the two injustices. "'
The Equitable Credit avoids this injustice by the pure allocation of
damages in accordance with fault, in a manner consistent with the
spirit of the compensation act.
A final thought on the compromise of workmen's compensation:
If this is the justification for the exclusive remedy rule, it
ought logically to follow that the employer should be spared damage
liability only when compensation liability has actually been provided in its place, or, to state the matter from the employee's point
of view, rights of action for damages should not be deemed taken
away except when something of value has been put in their place.'2 4
Thus, in example A 1, $4,000 of the $10,000 judgment awarded the
longshoreman is used to repay the stevedore's lien. As the compensation benefits have been replaced by money from the shipowner, the
stevedore has paid nothing. Because, however, it has not incurred the
absolute liability prescribed by the LHWCA, there is no reason why it
should benefit from the statutory language isolating it from other
liability, whether to the longshoreman or to the shipowner. This problem, also, is obviated by the Equitable Credit.
3.

Prior Judicial Resolutions of Third-Party Dilemmas

Recognition of the dilemma associated with apportioning liability
in third-party employer mutual fault situations is not a recent development. 125 The early trend in many jurisdictions, however, was to protect negligent employers from contributing to the third party's liability
under the theory that the employer's compensation payments constituted
his sole and exclusive liability. 12 6 As time passed, a few jurisdictions,
utilizing a variety of weapons, began to crack the employers' armor.
123. 2 A. LARSoN, supra note 1, § 7520, at 14-261. It is interesting to note that in
LHWCA third-party litigation, only guilty stevedores are rewarded; the recoveries of
guilty longshoremen are reduced by the doctrine of comparative negligence.

124. Id. § 65.10, at 12-4.
125. Some commentators suggested solutions similar to those discussed herein
many years ago. See, e.g., McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture:

A Study of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-Employers, 37

TEXAs

L. REv. 389,

444-54 (1959); Note, Recent Developments in the Iowa Workmen's Compensation

Law Where Negligent Third Parties Are Involved, 37 IoWA L. REv. 84, 95 (1951);
36 MINN. L. REv. 549, 555 (1952).
126. See McCoid, supra note 125, at 437; Note, Contribution and Indemnity:
The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REv. 959, 963 (1956); Annot.,
53 A.L.R.2d 977, 982-84 (1957).
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Credits Based on State Law

Pennsylvania was an early exception to the "no contribution"
rule, allowing third parties to recover contribution from concurrently
negligent employers in an amount not exceeding compensation benefits
owed under the local statute.2 7 Procedurally, after an employee had
obtained a judgment against a third party for his damages, the third
party would claim contribution from the employer in the amount of
compensation benefits and pay the entire judgment to the employee.
Once the employee had been paid, he was required to return to his
employer the amount of compensation previously paid by the employer
to the employee. Thus, by a very circuitous method, the employer was
denied recovery of his lien, having in practice been required to pay it
out twice, but only allowed to recover it once.
The same result has been reached in North Carolina in a straightforward manner. Although a negligent third party may not seek contribution or indemnity from a concurrently negligent employer, the
third party may assert the employer's contributory negligence as a
defense, thereby obtaining a pro tanto reduction of liability to the extent
of workmen's compensation benefits.128 In later adopting the North
Carolina approach, the Supreme Court of California stated the pro
tanto rule:
[W]hether an action is brought by the employer or the employee,
-the third party tortfeasor should be able to invoke the concurrent
negligence of the employer to defeat its right to reimbursement,
since, in either event, -the action is brought for the benefit of the
employer to the 29
extent that compensation benefits have been paid
to the employee.'

The rule, which has been applied in third party actions by employees
whether or not the employer has intervened or been made a party in
127. Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 192, 14 A.2d 105, 110 (1940). Maio and other
similar Pennsylvania cases are discussed in Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977, 984-85 (1957).
128. See Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 669, 73 S.E.2d 886, 892 (1953) ; Essick v.
City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 211, 60 S.E.2d 106, 114 (1950); Brown v. Southern
Ry., 204 N.C. 668, 671, 169 S.E. 419, 420 (1933). The North Carolina rule is discussed in greater depth in Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REv. 959, 967--68 (1957); Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d

977, 986-87 (1957).
129. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 72, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377, 366 P2d 641, 649
(1961). For a discussion of the California rule see McCarthy, Witt vs. Jackson
Re-Examined, 3 LINCOLN L. Rv. 147 (1968) ; Comment, Workmen's Compensation:
The Impact of the Witt v. Jackson Rule on the Law of Third Party Settlements,
17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 651 (1970) ; Note, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 571 (1962).
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interest, 130 has been adopted in several other jurisdictions and its acceptance appears to be growing.181
The appeal of the pro tanto rule of limited contribution is based
on a blend of practical and equitable considerations. Practically, it
preserves rather than defeats the compensation system and harmonizes
it with the law of contribution. Equitably, it gives the third party
tortfeasor relief from the gross inequity of bearing the full burden for
wrongs caused in part by others, and it prevents negligent employers
from totally avoiding responsibility for compensating their employees.
Thus, while continuing to make injured workers whole, the system also
attempts to place the burden where the fault lies. The pro tanto
solution is not without its disadvantages, however. When compensation
payments are not complete at the time the third party action is tried,
it is impossible in most cases to calculate the amount of the credit owed
to the third party. Indeed, it has been suggested that chicanery by
employers in pressuring employees not to accept compensation benefits
as such until after the third party action is completed could completely
undermine pro tanto credits.

13 2

One possible approach states may take in dealing with this problem
is the one recently adopted by New York. In Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co.,' the court of appeals allowed a negligent third party to obtain
indemnification from a concurrently negligent employer based upon the
employer's proportionate fault. Accepting this tort law tour de force as
an accomplished fact, and reserving the question of the compensation
law's exclusive-remedy provision, one may go on to observe that the
end result may well be the most equitable yet achieved by any jurisdiction.'

3 4

130. Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 246, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552
(1963).
131. See Santisteven v. Dow Chemical Co., 362 F. Supp. 646 (D. Nev. 1973)
(interpreting state statutory scheme in diversity action); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Adams, 91 Idaho 151. 156, 417 P.2d 417, 422 (1966); Rylander v. Chicago Short
Line Ry., 17 Ill. 2d 618, 626, 161 N.E.2d 812, 816-17 (1959). District Judge Pettine,
in an innovative opinion in Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809
(D.R.I. 1968), felt that if the Rhode Island Supreme Court had been confronted with
this problem, it would have adopted Pennsylvania's rule permitting contribution.
Judge Pettine therefore permitted contribution to Newport Air Park. The decision
was vacated by the First Circuit, however, on the ground that federal law, and not the
law of Rhode Island, applied. The court held that no contribution was allowed under
the applicable statute. 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969).
132. See Note, Workmen's Compensation: Should a Contributorily Negligent
Employer be Subrogatedf, 42 IND. L.J. 430, 438-39 (1967).
133. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S2d 382, 391-92 (1972).
134. 2 A. LARsoN, srupra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-320.
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Credits Based on Federal Law

As was the case with most states, the early federal rule was that
no contribution could be obtained by a third party from a jointly negligent employer. 1 31 In 1951, the Third Circuit in Baccile v. Halcyon
Lines ' 6 adopted a contrary rule in what has been characterized as a
":sincere attempt to work out a sort of compromise to minimize the
apparent unfairness of an all-or-nothing disposition of the recoveryover problem."' 37 Baccile, a harbor worker, was injured on board a
ship owned by Halcyon Lines. After Halcyon had been sued as a
negligent third party, it attempted to obtain contribution from Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corporation, whose negligence was a concurrent cause of the injuries to Baccile, its employee.13 The trial court,
after finding both Haenn and Halcyon negligent, divided Baccile's
damages equally between them under a rule of admiralty generally
applied in collision cases. 3 9 The Third Circuit, while finding a right
of Halcyon to obtain contribution from Haeen, limited it to the amount
of workmen's compensation which Baccile could have collected from
Haenn under the LHWCA."4 ' In so doing, the court struck a balance
between what it saw as the competing interests in admiralty of dividing
liability according to fault and limiting the liability of employers of
longshoremen and harbor workers. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding in effect that there was no right to contribution in
non-collision cases.*41

Nearly twenty years passed before another form of credit surfaced
as a creature of federal law. The plaintiff in Murray v. United States 42
was a government employee injured in a falling elevator in a building
135. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950).
Contrary holdings were limited to a handful of federal district court decisions. See
The S.S. Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Calif. 1947); Rederii v. Jarka Corp., 26
F. Supp. 304 (D. Me. 1939), appeal dismissed, 110 F.2d 234 (1st Cir. 1940). See also
Portel v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); The Tampico, 45 F.
Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942), the force of which was diminished by the Second Circuit's decision in Matthews, supra.
136. 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951).
137. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-299.
138. In the trial court, the jury found Haenn seventy-five percent responsible and
Halcyon twenty-five percent responsible. Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 89 F. Supp. 765,
768 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
139. Id. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
140. 187 F.2d at 404.
141. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284-85
(1952). Interestingly, both Halcyon and Haenn claimed on appeal "that the decision
below limiting an employer's liability for contribution to those uncertain amounts recoverable under the Harbor Workers' Act [was] impractical and undesirable." Id.
at 284.
142. 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

19761

THE EQUITABLE

CREDIT

leased by the United States. The building owner, who was sued by
Murray, sought indemnity and contribution from the government.
Murray had received workmen's compensation from the government
pursuant to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 4 which, like
the LHWCA, precludes a suit against his employer by an injured
worker. As a consequence, the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the third-party building owner had no right to sue the employer for
contribution. 4 4 The court, however, went further:
Any inequity residing in the denial of contribution against the
employer is mitigated if not eliminated by our rule ...

that where

one joint tortfeasor causing injury compromises the claim, the
other tortfeasor, though unable to obtain contribution because the
settling tortfeasor had "bought his peace," is nonetheless protected
by having his tort judgment reduced by one-half, on the theory
that one-half of the claim was sold by the victim when he executed
the settlement. In our situation if the building owner is held
liable the damages payable should be limited to one-half of the
amount of damages sustained by plaintiff, assuming the facts
would have entitled the owner to contribution from the employer
if the statute had not interposed a bar. A tortfeasor jointly responsible with an employer is not compelled to pay the total
common law damages. The common law recovery of the injured
employee is thus reduced in consequence of the employee's compensation act, but that act145gave him assurance of compensation
even in the absence of fault.

While the Murray Credit has not been adopted outside the District of Columbia, it was recently reaffirmed there in Dawson v. Contractors Transport Corp.,148 the significance of which is heightened by
the fact that Dawson was covered by the LHWCA. 147 The rule allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors in admiralty 14 makes the
maritime area a fertile one for creation of new credit defenses "for it
is more likely to be in the climate of contribution that 'Murray credit'
seeds can germinate."1 49 While credit defenses are undoubtedly still

in their infancy, the "determination and ingenuity displayed in Baccile,
143. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-50 (1970).
144. 405 F.2d at 1364.
145. Id. at 1365-66, citing Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir.
1962). It is worthy of note that Chief Justice Burger (then Circuit Judge) was a
member of the panel which gave birth to the "Murray credit." For an excellent
discussion of Murray see 2 A. LARsoN, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-314 through -319.

146. 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
147. The LHWCA is codified in the District of Columbia at 36 D.C. CODE §
501 (1973).
148. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
149. Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 8, at 601.
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Murray, Newport Air Park, and the Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
California and New York cases, are strong evidence of a conviction
that some device ought to be found to arrive at a compromise of the
interests of employer and third party in [workmen's compensation]
1' 50

cases.

B.

Credit Defenses in Post-Amendment Cases

As noted earlier, 5 ' there has been some conflict in decisions handed
down thus far in cases arising under the 1972 amendments. Some of
the inconsistency may be traced to consideration of different credits,
while the balance discloses basic disagreement among the courts as to
the purpose of the amendments and how to resolve conflicts between
the LHWCA, as amended, and general principles of maritime law.
The first case to consider credit defenses was Lucas v. "Brinknes"
Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G.,11 2 in which the

defendant shipowner asserted both a pro rata Murray Credit and a
pro tanto credit. In granting the plaintiff's motion to strike the credit
defenses, the court noted Congressional "concern that the stevedore
employer would not be held liable for any damages caused by the vessel
owner's negligence." '1 5' In conclusion, the court stated:
Congress sought to eliminate all actions against the stevedore
whether for indemnity or contribution, whether based on tort or
-on contract, and whether for fees and expenses. Allowance of any
such actions, even a pro tanto recovery to the extent of payments
made by the employer under the Act, would create the circuitous
type action Congress considered was too costly
and disruptive of
154
the compensation scheme to be permitted.
While perhaps correct in stating that Congress intended to curtail
-indemnity and contribution from stevedore to shipowner, the court's
analysis in striking credit defenses is not persuasive. Apparently it
was assumed that the credit defenses asserted were the equivalent of a
prayer for contribution. Indeed, the court even characterized the
Murray Credit as a "rule of contribution"' 55 even though the Murray
court plainly stated that contribution could not be permitted in that
case. 5' The Lucas court then stated, without discussion, that applica150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-321.
See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Id. at 767. See id. at 768.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 764.
405 F.2d at 1364.
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tion of a credit would bring about disruption and delay. Credit defenses
aside, a shipowner is certain to introduce whatever evidence he can
obtain which tends to show that stevedore negligence caused the accident. The stronger the evidence against a stevedore, the weaker it must
become against the shipowner. Once all such evidence has been presented, asking a jury to determine the percentage of stevedore's negligence in addition to that of longshoreman and shipowner creates little
or no extra burden. It is difficult to imagine how application of a credit,
especially the Equitable Credit which is calculated and applied with
so little difficulty, can be said to cause any more delay than is inevitably
present whenever the injured worker chooses to bring a third-party
action.
A case recently decided by the Second Circuit peripherally con-

57
cerns credit defenses. The shipowner in Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co.,

attempted to join the stevedore's compensation carrier as an indispensible party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based
on the theory that the insurer had a cause of action against the shipowner to recover its compensation payments.' 5" Apparently, the shipowner intended to use this as a vehicle to raise the stevedore's negligence
in its own defense. The lower court granted the insurer's motion to
dismiss on -the grounds that no such cause of action then existed. On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed,15 9 stating its belief that to reduce
the stevedore's full recovery of its workmen's compensation payments
would be contrary to the 1972 amendments.16 °
The first West Coast case to review credit defenses was Shellnan
v. United States Lines Operators,Inc., 6 1 in which United States Lines
asserted a Murray Credit in its defense. The motion of the stevedore's
subrogated insurer to dismiss the defense was granted, but the court's
decision opened the door for application of a credit similar to the
Equitable Credit. First, the court quickly disposed of the Murray
Credit.
Murray cannot be applied here because in spite of the attempt
of the court to reach an equitable result, the failure is obvious.
Murray accomplishes its purpose only where (1) the negligence
of the employer is 50%, and, (2) the compensation act recovery is
157. 386 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
158. See Federal Maine Terminal, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S.
404 (1969).
159. 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975).
160. See notes 267-70 and accompanying text infra. Credit defenses were also
rejected in Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 1975 A.M.C. 1505 (D. Ore.
1975), with judgment for the longshoreman resulting.
161. 1975 A.M.C. 362 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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50% of what a judge or jury finds to be the actual damage suffered
by the employee,
and (3) no lien is allowed to an offending
162
employer.

The court then went on to examine the relationship between the parties.
If he recovered from United States Lines, Shellman would have been
required to repay the insurer's compensation lien before obtaining any
additional recovery for himself. Thus, as plaintiff, Shellman wore two
hats; he was, in effect, suing both for his own use and for the use of
his employer's subrogated insurer. Because United States Lines would
receive a credit to the degree of Shellman's negligence, the Shellman
court reasoned that it should similarly be given a credit to the extent
of the stevedore's negligence.' 63 Thus the court, of its own volition,
approved the application of an Equitable Credit.
A potential analytical problem with Shellman lies in its analysis
of the 1972 amendments. The court stated that its decision was guided
by the following language from the LHWCA: "If such person was
employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action
shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons
engaged in providing stevedoring services to its vessel.

'1 64

It appears

that this language was meant to apply to those special situations in
which the shipowner also acts itself as the stevedore. Language nearly
identical to that portion of the LHWCA quoted in Shellman appears
in the House Committee Report and supports this view. 6 5 Whether
the language relied on by Shellman was also intended to reach normal
162. Id. at 368.
163. Id. at 369-70. At the

same time, a pro tanto defense was rejected.
164. Id. at 370, citing 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
165. The HousE REPORT states:
The Committee has also recognized the need for special provisions to deal

with a case where a longshoreman or ship builder or repairman is employed
directly by the vessel. In such case, notwithstanding the fact that the vessel is the
employer, the Supreme Court, in Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963) and
Jackson v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 386 U.S. 731 (1967), held that the unseaworthiness remedy is available to the injured employee. The Committee believes
that the rights of an injured longshoreman or ship builder or repairman should
not depend on whether he was employed directly by the vessel or by an independent contractor. Accordingly, the bill provides in the case of a longshoreman
who is employed directly by the vessel there will be no action for damages if the
injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in performing long-

shoring services. Similar provisions are applicable to ship building or repair employees directly by the vessel. The Committee's intent is that the same principles

should apply in determining liability of the vessel which employs its own longshoremen or ship builders or repairmen as apply when an independent contractor
employs such persons.
HoUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 7-8, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong.,
at 4705.
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third party situations is doubtful. To the contrary, the introductory
phrase - "If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services" - would appear to limit the operation of the remainder
of the sentence to that group. Therefore, it appears unlikely that an
appellate court would view with favor an argument that longshoremen
employed indirectly by vessels through an independent stevedoring
contractor are included within the scope of the statutory language
quoted in Shellman.
To be fair to the Shellman court, it is possible that the language
concerning persons "employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring
services" was included in the opinion only to point out the inconsistency
of the language "caused by the negligence of" as that phrase is used in
the first three sentences of section 5(b).'" However, regardless of
the intended meaning of that portion of Shellman, that language does
nothing to undermine the viability of the Shellman credit. 167 The
presence or absence of language compelling the credit is not critical
so long as the statute is devoid of language prohibiting it. From our
earlier discussion, it is evident that no such prohibition exists.1 68
When the trial court in Frasca v. Prudential-GraceLines, Inc.'69
was confronted with a finding of mutual fault, it had before it the conflicting decisions of Lucas and Shellman. The court found itself "persuaded by the reasoning of the court in Shellman . . . and by the
language of the Longshoremen's Act, as amended, . . . that an offset
or credit on the damages assessed [was] indicated.' 170 The Frasca
court then rejected the Murray Credit as being inequitable in most
circumstances and adopted the Equitable Credit as one which can and
will produce an equitable result in all instances."171
Two decisions handed down this year in the District of Oregon
have further muddied the waters. In Hubbardv. GreatPacific Shipping
Co., Monrovia,1 72 the Murray Credit and a credit based upon Shellman
were both rejected because they "would have the result of negating
Congress's intent of eliminating direct or indirect third-party actions
166. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
167. Shelman was argued on appeal before the Ninth Circuit concurrently with
Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 1975 A.M.C. 1505 (D. Ore. 1974),
which rejected credit defenses asserted by the shipowner. Opinions were issued on
November 21, 1975, after this article was virtually complete. For a discussion of those
opinions see the addendum to this article infra.
168. See notes 49-100 and accompanying text supra.
169. 1975 A.M.C. 1130, 1143 (D. Md. 1975).
170. Id. at 1144.
171. Id.
172. 1975 A.M.C. 1518 (D. Ore. 1975).
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in longshoreman-injury cases as embodied in the 1972 Amendments
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act."' 173
Similarly, credit defenses were disallowed in Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B. V. Rijswijk,174 but only in deference to the holding
of Hubbard.'75 The Croshaw court would clearly have preferred a
different result, based upon its belief "that the legislative scheme, construed in its entirety, does contemplate an offset in these circumstances."1'76 After rejecting the Murray Credit, the court then stated
its preference for the Equitable Credit as being consistent with the
Supreme Court's recent condemnation of arbitrary and inequitable dam177
age rules in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.

173. Id. at 1520.
174. 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975).
175. Hubbard was heard by the Chief Judge for District of Oregon. Thus, the
trial judge in Croshaw felt he "must conform to the Hubbard decision to maintain
uniformity of law within the district."
176. 398 F. Supp. at 1231. The court was particularly critical of the manner in
which Hubbard sidestepped the hard questions concerning apportionment between
shipowners and stevedores.
It would apparently apply comparative negligence between the shipowner and the
plaintiff as dictated by the Act and accept reduction of damages by the percentage
of the plaintiff's comparative negligence. But the shipowner is held liable for the
remainder, regardless of the stevedore's concurrent negligence. The inequities of
this program are obvious. If the stevedore were 90% negligent, the 10% negligence of the shipowner would be sufficient to cripple him with the entire judgment. Some jurisdictions tolerate this, but I cannot.
Id. at 1232.
177. 421 U.S. 397 (1975). The Croshaw court found its task simple when Compared to the obstacles the Supreme Court overcame in unanimously deciding
Reliable Transfer.
Reliable Transfer overruled a century and a half of judicial precedent. I need not
overcome such formidable obstacles. The 1972 amendments expressly authorize
comparative negligence. Congress has left the mechanics of its application to the
courts, as is customary.
398 F. Supp. at 1233.
The only other case to consider credit defenses thus far is Kroft v. Nedlloyd &
Hoegh Line, Civil No. 73-306-AAH (C.D. Calif., 1975). The longshoreman's damages
were found by the jury to be $58,000. Furthermore, in answering Special Interrogatories submitted by the judge, the jury determined that the negligence of the plaintiff
had contributed two percent to his injury and that the stevedore's concurring negligence had been twenty-five percent responsible. In charging the jury, the judge instructed them:
If you should find that the stevedoring contractor was negligent, and such
negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, then you should determine the damages, if any, to which the plaintiff would have been entitled. You
will then reduce the amount of damages by that proportion by which the stevedoring contractor was negligent.
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 8, as modified and given by the judge in
Kroft. Applying this instruction to the findings of negligence, the judgment was
reduced a total of twenty-seven percent, and the plaintiff was therefore awarded
$42,340. It appears that comparable results might have been obtained in other postamendment cases in which similar special interrogatories were given to juries, but
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The Equitable Credit has been favorably received. It is not surprising that judges are generally receptive to a formula which does
not conflict with the basic legislative design of the LHWCA and,
moreover, has as its main thrust the notion of fundamental fairness to
all parties. While the reaction of attorneys representing longshoremen
has thus far been mixed, 178 stevedoring interests have been understandably cool to the Equitable Credit. Without it, they stand to
recover compensation payments even when their fault is ninety-nine
percent responsible for an employee's injury. It may therefore be
anticipated that several arguments will be raised to attack the Equitable
Credit in trial and appellate courts.
which were mooted by verdicts for the defendant shipowners. See Milton v. American President Lines, Ltd., Civil No. C 74-0950 SC (N.D. Calif., Mar. 11, 1975);
White v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 1975 A.M.C. 191 (D. Md. 1974). It should be noted
that the interrogatories submitted in these cases did not instruct the jury to make
any calculations or reduce any damages. Those functions were retained by the judge.
While it does not appear that there is any reason for asking juries to determine the
relative percentages of vessel and stevedore responsibility unless application of a
credit is contemplated, it is nonetheless possible that the judges in Milton and White
could have held the shipowners liable for all proven damages.
178. While the plaintiffs' bar has not generally endorsed the Equitable Credit to
date, it would appear that a uniform application of the credit would benefit longshoremen by encouraging settlement of third-party claims. The 1972 amendments to
the LHWCA have thus far made settlement virtually impossible in many, if not most
cases. Because of the vast improvements in compensation benefits, compensation liens
frequently approach the amount of damages which may reasonably be expected at trial.
Whenever the shipowner's prospects for avoiding liability are substantial, settlement
becomes impossible. In a non-credit setting, the plaintiff longshoreman obviously
cannot afford to settle for less than he expects to receive in compensation. Thus, a
stalemate is formed; the plaintiff's minimum demand is higher than the maximum
settlement value placed on the case by the shipowner. The result is trial in the
majority of cases. While this problem could be greatly alleviated if stevedores or
their insurers would agree to waive all or part of their claim for reimbursement, such
waivers generally have not been offered. And indeed, there is no reason to expect
them. If credit defenses are disallowed and a judgment entered for the longshoreman,
the stevedore will generally obtain recovery of its entire lien. If the vessel is exonerated, nothing is lost. Therefore, stevedores have very little incentive to enter into
settlement negotiations. See Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 763 (2d
Cir. 1975) (suggesting that employers not subject to a defense of concurrent negligence have little incentive to settle, but leaving resolution of the problem for Congress).
When a credit is applied, all of this changes. Stevedores will realize that if
they are found at fault, they will lose part, if not all, of their lien. Thus, they are encouraged to give up part of their lien rather than risk it all. If the shipowner is
then willing to provide enough "new money" above and beyond that necessary to
satisfy part of the stevedore's lien, settlement can be effected. The Supreme Court has
indicated its belief that application of comparative negligence standards, which would
be used in an Equitable Credit, tends to encourage out-of-court settlements. In
Reliable Transfer, the Court stated, "Experience with comparative negligence in the
personal injury area teaches that a rule of fairness in court will produce fair out-of-

court settlements." United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
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The Viability of the "No Contribution" Agreement

At common law there was no contribution between joint tortfeasors
on the theory that wrongdoers should not be allowed to avoid the
consequences of their actions. Feeling the result to be unnecessarily
harsh, approximately one-half of the states passed statutes permitting
contribution while others have judicially adopted a similar rule. 1 9
Admiralty was an early leader in developing systems for apportioning fault.'
While the rule was intially limited to collision cases
by Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,'81 it has
recently been extended into the area of personal injuries.8 2 That
extension, however, suggested that the Halcyon rule remained good
law on its facts; negligent third parties could still not obtain contribution
from concurrently negligent employers whose liability was limited exclusively by statute to payment of workmen's compensation.'
Naturally, stevedoring interests can be expected to argue that the
Halcyon rule, when joined by the exclusivity provisions of the
LHWCA, as amended, denies the judiciary any freedom to apply credit
defenses. In analyzing that argument, several inquiries are necessary:
(1) What did Halcyon stand for when decided? (2) What role did
Congress intend for Halcyon in adopting the 1972 amendments to the
LHWCA? (3) What does Halcyon stand for now? and (4) What is
the nature of the relief sought in credit defenses, particularly the
Equitable Credit?
1.

The Remnants of Halcyon

Prior to the decision in Halcyon, there had been a split of authority
on the question of whether a shipowner could obtain contribution from
a stevedore for liability resulting from injuries suffered by an employee
of the stevedore. A number of early district court opinions had allowed
contribution, 8 4 but the precedential value of some of them had later
179. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50, at 307; Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REv. 959, 960
(1956). For a brief bibliography of articles on this subject see W. PROSSER, supra,
§ 56, at 307 nn.58-60.
180. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. See Staring, supra note 39, at
305-10.
181. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
182. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
183. Id. at 112-13.

184. See Portel v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Robinson v.
National Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. La. 1948); Coal Operators
Cas. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Pa. 1947); The S.S. Samovar, 72
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been undermined by contrary decisions in the courts of appeals.""5 In
Halcyon, the Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict."8 6
The precise holding of Halcyon is somewhat puzzling. Ostensibly
the Court held "that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new
judicial rules of contribution and that the solution of this problem
should await congressional action."'8 7 In practice, however, a court
can never merely decline to decide a question, for the abdication results
in perpetuation of the status quo, normally to the detriment of the
party seeking relief. Thus, while Halcyon postponed resolution of the
dilemma, its effect was to deny shipowners a right of contribution from
concurrently negligent employers. That deference to Congress should
cause such results at all is regrettable; that courts should permit it to
happen in admiralty, over which congressional power is found only by
implication in the jurisdictional grant to the judiciary, 8 is particularly
unfortunate.
By declining to decide, the Halcyon Court dismissed the contention
that under maritime law damages should be apportioned by simply
stating that "this Court has never expressly applied [that rule] to
non-collision cases.'1 8 9 One thing is clear in the opinion: it was not
based on any interpretation of the LHWCA. In a footnote, the Court
stated: "We find it unnecessary to decide this question"' 90 of "whether
application of the rule or the amount of contribution should be limited
by the Harbor Workers' Act . .. .""'
While the relevant inquiry concerns what vitality remains after
the passage of two decades of growth in maritime law, there are serious
doubts whether Halcyon was good law even when decided. Because the
denial of contribution was not based on the LHWCA as it then existed,
the Court must have believed that Halcyon was not entitled to contribuF. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947); The Tampico, 45 F. Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942);
Rederii v. Jarka Corp., 26 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. Me. 1939), appeal dismissed, 110 F.2d
234 (1st Cir. 1940).
185. See Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953); American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); Porello v. United
States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946), modified on appeal sub norn., 330 U.S. 446
(1947). Contra, Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir.), rev'd sub nora.
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1951); United
States v. Rothchild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950). Pre-Halcyon
cases are discussed in Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977, 987-92 (1957).
186. 342 U.S. at 283-84.
187. Id. at 285.
188. U.S. CONs'T. art. III, § 2. See generally Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in The Nineteenth Century, 67 H~Av. L. REv.
1214 (1954).
189. 342 U.S. at 284 (footnote omitted).
190. Id. at 286-87 n.12.
191. Id. at 286.
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tion even in the absence of any statute. Such a notion could only have
been based upon the underlying body of maritime decisional law.
Personal injury cases in admiralty have not generally been judged
under principles different from those normally applied in other maritime
matters. In apportioning fault in an early personal injury case, the
Court found the rule "applicable to all like cases of marine tort founded
upon negligence and prosecuted in admiralty, as in harmony with the
rule for the division of damages in cases of collision."' 92 No reason is
apparent why, as suggested by Halcyon without amplification, principles
applicable in adjudicating marine collisions should differ from those
applied where personal injuries arise from other causes. Indeed, Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,'93 decided shortly after Halcyon, confirmed
that judicial discretion to create equitable rules existed in cases of personal injury. In denying a contention that contributory negligence
should bar the plaintiff's action, Mr. Justice Black, who also authored
Halcyon, stated:
The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory
negligence wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible with modern admiralty policy and practice.
Exercising its traditional discretion, admiralty has developed and
now follows its own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such
consideration of contributory
negligence in mitigation of damages
94
as justice requires.1
Doubt further exists, beyond the wisdom of the judicial methodology utilized in Halcyon, as to whether the Court was even accurate in
saying -that principles of contribution had previously been limited to collision cases. While it is true that few, if any, such cases actually reached
the Supreme Court, a rash of lower court cases allowed contribution in a
wide variety of situations.'9 5 Interestingly, the pre-Halcyon denials of
contribution by lower courts' 9" seem to have invariably been based on
the language of -the compensation act, ostensibly assuming that con97
tribution would be available were the statute not a bar.1
192. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
193. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
194. Id. at 408-09, citing The Max Morris.
195. See generally Staring, supra note 39, at 321-34.
196. See, e.g., cases gathered in note 185 supra.
197. The preceding analysis is based in part on the highly critical discussion of
Halcyon in H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 519-41 (1958). The authors
concluded:
at one stroke the Court (1) reached an unsound conclusion in the case before
it, (2) destroyed the harmony of the underlying maritime law in this general area;
and (3) established a precedent which puts in question the continued vitality in the
federal courts of the whole Anglo-American tradition of growth of decisional law.
Id. at 535.
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Subsequent cases did little to amplify the true meaning of Halcyon.
The same issue in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn 9 8 was decided on
authority of Halcyon without discussion.' 99 The Court did rule, however, that a credit to the shipowner in the amount of compensation
paid by the stevedore "would be the substantial equivalent of contribution which we declined to require in the Halcyon case."'2 0 A few years
later, the decision of the Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.20 ' emasculated Halcyon by implying a
promise by the stevedore to perform its work in a workmanlike manner,
breach of which would lead to indemnity. The question naturally
follows whether Halcyon has been reincarnated, since the 1972 amendments eliminated indemnification based upon warranties of workmanlike performance in third-party compensation cases.
The abdicating holding of Halcyon cannot stand today. Since the
Court invited it to consider the question almost a quarter of a century
ago, Congress, despite passing significant amendments to the LHWCA
in 1972, has thus far failed to discuss the apportionment of liability to
an injured longshoreman between a concurrently negligent stevedore
and shipowner. In light of past experience, a continued judicial policy
to await congressional direction is unrealistic. Because Congress has
decided not to accept the invitation to legislate on this point, the
courts must confront the issue squarely. Halcyon did not reach the
issue of whether the LHWCA, as it then existed, prohibited such
contribution, 02 so its continuing validity cannot rest upon the 1972
amendments to the LHWCA. Therefore, if Halcyon is to retain any
vitality, it must be based on the existence of a non-statutory rule
prohibiting contribution from a stevedore to a shipowner. 0 5 Since the
198. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
199. Id. at 408.
200. Id. at 412.
201. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
202. See text accompanying notes 190-91 supra.
203. It is worth noting that even the presence of the LHWCA might be unavailing
in the face of contrary principles of maritime law. See Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963); The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
In The Chattahoochee, the rules of the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1970),
exempting shipowners from liability for losses occurring due to navigational errors of
the crew were required to give way to the admiralty rule of divided damages in collision cases. An analogous rule was applied in Weyerhaeuser where the Court held
that the exclusivity provision of the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 757(b) (1970), must similarly yield in collision cases. Some efforts have been made
to distinguish Weyerhaeuser from the typical third-party longshoring case because
"[tihe moiety obligation, unlike contribution between tortfeasors generally, is indeed
a separate duty based, not on the two wrongdoers' mutual relation to the plaintiff, but
on their relation to each other." 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-302. Whether
this distinction is helpful is uncertain. It seems to suggest that when a longshoreman
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decision in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,2 4 however,
contribution in such circumstances is clearly the rule of admiralty.
The Halcyon opinion was unavoidably a subject of discussion in
Cooper Stevedoring, as it was relied upon by those parties seeking to
avoid liability for contribution. In reviewing its earlier decision in
Halcyon, the Court said:
Confronted with the possibility that any workable rule of contribution might be inconsistent with the balance struck by Congress
in the Harbor Workers' Act between the interests of carriers,
employers, employees, and their respective insurers, we refrain
from allowing contribution in the circumstances of that case.
These factors underlying our decision in Halcyon still have
much force. Indeed, the 1972 amendments to the Harbor Workers'
Act re-emphasize Congress' determination that as between an
employer and its injured employee, the right to compensation
under the Act should be the employee's exclusive remedy.2" 5
Such an argument, however, is a far cry from an assertion that the
stevedore must always recover his lien regardless of his fault or that
to prohibit the stevedore from recovering that which he is already
required by the LHWCA to pay is void because it is contribution
prohibited by Halcyon.
Since Cooper Stevedoring went on to distinguish Halcyon on its
facts, the language quoted above is not related to the Court's holding
that "[o]n the facts of this case . . .no countervailing considerations

detract from the well-established maritime rule allowing contribution
between joint tortfeasors."2 °8
What weight then, if any, should be given to the language in
Cooper Stevedoring discussing Halcyon? It is evident that Halcyon
was not fortified by any newly formed rules of law.20 7 Rather, its
sues a shipowner, no contribution may be obtained from the stevedore, but when the
stevedore sues to recover its lien as in Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside
Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 409 (1969), alleging breach of a duty owed the stevedore
by the shipowner, that contribution would be in order. The Supreme Court decision in
Weyerhaeuser is discussed in detail in 2 A. LARsoN, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-300
to -306; Weyerhaeuser and subsequent case, Drake v. Treadwell Const. Co., 229 F.2d
789 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 372 U.S. 772 (1963) (which
relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Weyerhaeuser) are also discussed in Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Third-Party Action Against A Virginia Employer
in Tort, 9 U. RIcH. L. REV. 159, 166-67 n.26 (1974).
204. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
205. Id. at 112.
206. Id. at 113.
207. Because the Court stated that compensation was an employee's exclusive

remedy against his employer, Cooper Stevedoring arguably stands for the proposition
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continued viability rests on the present validity of the original opinion,
which has already been criticized above. The remains of Halcyon may
thus be summarized: payment of compensation is an employer's sole
obligation under the LHWCA, and third parties may not increase the
stevedore's exposure by seeking contribution for their tort liability to
injured longshoremen. The Equitable Credit is a different concept
altogether. The stevedore is not asked to pay more to its employee
because it was at fault. The credit simply acts to prevent it from
recovering its lien in those circumstances. Thus, rather than negating
the viability of an Equitable Credit, Halcyon lends support to its
application.
B.

The Equitable Credit as Contribution

No discussion of the present status of the Halcyon no-contribution
rule would be complete without a determination of the effect on the
rule, if any, of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. Section 5(b),
in its discussion of a shipowner's liability to a longshoreman, states
in part that "the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such
damages.""' Professors Gilmore and Black noted that "[i]t would
have been perfectly simple to adopt the Halcyon rule of no contribution
in § 905(b) : The employer, even if his negligence has contributed to
the injury, shall not be liable. .

.""'

The fact of the matter is that

no such language is present. While not necessarily persuasive that
Congress intentionally ignored Halcyon,210 the absence of language to
that effect does constitute strong evidence that the Congress did not
consider Halcyon and thus made no attempt to codify the rule for which
that case is remembered.
No mention is made of contribution in the amendments themselves.
The legislative history, despite its length, contains only the briefest
mention. The Committee Reports,21 for example, speak only of prohibiting "hold-harmless, indemnity or contribution agreements . . .as
that an injured worker is barred from seeking recovery from a third person for damages incurred due to the employer's negligence. It would be wise to recall, however, that
the language relied upon for such an argument is dictum.
208. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). The entire section is set out in the
text accompanying note 9 supra.

209. G. GiLMORE & C.

BLACK, supra note 8, at 451 (emphasis added).

210. Similarly inconclusive is a recent statement by the Second Circuit, "We see
nothing in the statute to exclude it." Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 761
n.4 (2d Cir. 1975). The mere failure to exclude the Halcyon rule, without some evidence that it was being considered by Congress, cannot support an argument that it was
codified by section 905(b).
211.

See notes 14 and 44 supra.
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a matter of public policy ...
,"' That prohibition is a far cry from
an edict forbidding limited equitable contribution by court order in the
form of non-recoverable compensation payments where the concurring
fault of a shipowner and stevedore caused an injury to a longshoreman.
Assuming arguendo, however, that as a result of Halcyon and the 1972
amendments a "no contribution" rule exists, it does not automatically
follow that the Equitable Credit must thereby fall.
Much has been written in a continuing attempt to define contribution. It is generally agreed that before contribution may be obtained,
there must exist a "joint tort."2 1 The meaning of "joint tort" and
identification of the term "joint tortfeasors," however, is a more difficult
proposition. Dean Prosser has said: "The contribution defendant must
be a tortfeasor, and originally liable to the plaintiff. If there was never
any such liability, as where he has the defense of . . . substitution of
workmen's compensation for common law liability, then he is not liable
for contribution.12 14 This formulation has proved to be a major hurdle
for third parties attempting to obtain contribution from negligent employers in a compensation setting,21 5 and has long been used by stevedores in resisting contribution bids by shipowners.2 1 The stevedore is
absolutely liable under the LHWCA for compensation benefits. The
shipowner is liable for damages if proved negligent. Because their
respective liabilities are different in nature, scope, and operation, there
is no common liability and hence no contribution."
So goes the
argument.
Because contribution is basically an equitable doctrine,21 ' however,
a variety of attempts have been made to achieve equitable results in
workmen's compensation situations where common liability of an employer and third party could not be shown. 1 9 The rule in Pennsylvania
212. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 7, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong.,
at 4704.
213. See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (1956).
214. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50, at 309.
215. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-305 to -306.
216. See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir.
1950) ; Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946), modified on appeal sub
nom. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947).
217. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.21, at 14-295 to -298; McCoid, supra
note 125, at 437; Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REV. 959, 960 (1956). For a survey of cases in which contribution was denied because of an absence of common liability see Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d
977, 980-82 (1957).
218. See Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Staring,
supra note 39, at 335.
219. Some of these schemes "required a patent circumvention of the legislatures'
expressed intent." Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's
Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REV. 959, 963 (1956).
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bases allowance of contribution on a finding of joint negligence rather
than requiring joint liability. 220

The necessity for such semantical

gymnastics makes the question of contribution in compensation cases
one ripe for criticism. While the requirement of common liability is
well entrenched in the law, there is no clear reason why it should defeat
contribution in those cases where one party will otherwise be unjustly
enriched at the expense of another. 22 ' This is especially true in admiralty, which has traditionally apportioned damages despite the lack
of any common liability.

2

In response to just this problem, the Third Circuit once attempted
to permit contribution in a third-party longshoreman's case by changing
the test to "mutual wrongdoers. ' 22 ' By using a "mutual wrongdoer"
analysis, liability could be apportioned in a more equitable fashion.
When this concept comes into conflict .with a legislative directive, it
must naturally bow to the extent necessary to accommodate the intent of
Congress. Thus, while a shipowner would be entitled to pass on a
portion of the ultimate liability for injuries suffered by a longshoreman
to the worker's negligent employer, the stevedore's liability could not
exceed its compensation exposure. 2 4 In essence, this is how the
Equitable Credit functions.
If one considers contribution in a narrow sense - a sharing of
liability by two parties liable in common to a third - the Equitable
Credit cannot be considered as contribution and thus cannot run afoul
of the rule of Halcyon, should that prove to have endured. Moreover,
the Credit does not conflict with the LHWCA because it requires an
employer to do no more than he would have been required to do by
statute had no third party become involved. On the other hand, if one
views contribution very generally - as any sharing of ultimate liability
for injuries to a workman - then, while the Equitable Credit is
certainly contribution, it is also approved by the LHWCA. Congress
could not have meant to prohibit contribution in this general sense, for
it is sure to be present whenever compensation benefits exceed proven
220. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-306; Note, Contribution and
Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REV. 959, 966-68
(1956) ; Comment, supra note 112, at 163. The Pennsylvania contribution rule is discussed in greater detail at note 127 and accompanying text supra.
221. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 197, at 524-25.
222. See id. at 525-26 and cases cited therein.
223. Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), discussed at notes
136-26 and accompanying text supra. Unfortunately, the concept was brushed aside
without much comment by the Supreme Court in Halcyon.
224. See Note, Workmens' Compensation: Should a Contributorily Negligent
Employer be Subrogated?, 42 IND. L.J. 430, 440 (1967).
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damages at law. In such a case, although the entire third-party judgment will be used to repay the stevedore's lien, some will remain
unrecovered. Thus, the shipowner and the stevedore have each paid
a portion of the longshoreman's total monetary recovery for his injuries. 225 When there is no negligent third party, the stevedore and
the longshoreman "share" the loss. Thus, in the general sense, a stevedore "contributes" in every compensation case. The fortuitous happenstance that a third party later becomes liable to the longshoreman for
additional damages cannot change the basic nature of compensation
payments. Rather, a stevedore should only be permitted to obtain
reimbursement to the degree necessary to avoid unjustly enriching
either the longshoreman or the shipowner.
VII.

THE ROLE OF STEVEDORES AND THEIR
SUBROGATED

INSURERS

While one of the stated purposes of the 1972 amendments to the
226
LHWCA was to avoid costly and time-consuming tripartite litigation,
the Act as amended nonetheless recognizes that longshoremen, stevedores, and shipowners all have rights and duties which may, and indeed
usually will, bring them together in most typical third-party actions
filed by longshoremen against shipowners. A longshoreman need not
elect whether to receive compensation or sue a third party,2 27 and in
the vast majority of cases, he will have received some compensation
benefits before filing his third-party claim. Naturally, if liability of the
third party can be established, the employer will seek to recover the
payments it has made to its employee pursuant to the compensation
act. The LHWCA explicitly recognizes this fact by assigning to the
employer the employee's cause of action against any negligent third
party if the employee fails to bring suit himself within six months after
225. In some cases this is not true. A stevedore may recover the excess in a
common law suit against the shipowner. However, the negligence of the stevedore
may be raised by the shipowner in its defense. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v.
Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
226. Senator Javits stated, "Our real concern in this regard is not doing away
with the negligence concept. It is structuring it in such a fashion that the courts
cannot repeat all over again what they repeated on the circular liability suits in contrast to the clear intent of Congress from 1946 forward." Senate Hearings, supra
note 71, at 38.
227. Section 33(a) of the LHWCA states:
If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable
under this chapter the person entitled to such compensation determines that some
person other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ is liable in
damages, he need not elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover
damages against such third person.
33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1970).
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formal award of compensation benefits.228 While no express assignment
appears in the LHWCA for benefits paid between the time of injury
and the completion of compensation proceedings, it is clear that the
stevedore nonetheless has some interest, accruing at the moment of its
initial payment, in being reimbursed by any third party ultimately
2 29
found at fault.
When an accident occurs due to mutual fault of shipowner and
stevedore, complications arise. Obviously the blameless employee may
have his compensation and also proceed against the shipowner, but
he may not recover twice.230 His recovery is limited by damages proven
in court or by maximum workmen's compensation benefits, whichever
is greater. When the sum of compensation paid prior to judgment
and damages awarded in the third-party 'action exceed the maximum
recovery, the longshoreman must return the excess to someone. It is
here that the interests of shipowner and stevedore clash. Normally, the
stevedore does not actively enter the third-party litigation. He merely
stands outside the courthouse door, palm outstretched, to receive reimbursement of compensation benefits from the longshoreman's thirdparty recovery. The shipowner, however, understandably wants to
keep the excess for himself where his fault was small when compared to
that of the stevedore. Therefore, in order to make the longshoreman
whole while limiting his own liability, the shipowner must find a method
of bringing the stevedore into the courtroom so that the rights of all
parties are properly represented. Stevedores, in the meantime, can be
expected to oppose such attempts on the ground that before judgment
they have no interest in the proceedings and that to bring them into
the courtroom would defeat the legislative intent to end tripartite litiga228. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1970).
229. See International Terminal Operating Co. v. Waterman Steamship Co., *272
F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960) ; The Etna, 138 F.2d 37,
40 (3d Cir. 1943). Typically, when a longshoreman is injured he is completely unable
to work for a period of time. During this incapacity, he receives compensation for his
temporary total disability without benefit of an award and is also provided with free
medical treatment. Once his condition stabilizes, it becomes possible for physicians
to determine what permanent partial or permanent total disability, if any, he has
suffered. Until such determination is made, it is unusual for any award to occur.
If a longshoreman is severely injured and has a promising third-party claim,
he will usually bring it before final adjudication of his compensation benefits. This
enables the longshoreman to pursue a more substantial monetary award while still
retaining the right to final determination of compensation for permanent partial disability if he loses. If he wins, of course, his recovery will likely exceed the value of a
potential compensation award, and he will never press his compensation claim. He
does retain, however, the right to seek additional compensation after a successful thirdparty action. 33 U.S.C. § 933(f) (1970).
230. See The Etna, 138 F.2d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1943) ; 2 A. LARsoN, supra note 1,
§ 71.20.
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tion. 3 ' Courts thus far have divided in their approach to this problem,
leaving the issue very much up in the air.
A.

Bringing in the Stevedore

Maritime law has long permitted an employer to protect its subrogated interests through intervention in an action brought against a
shipowner by one of its employees. 23 2 Moreover, since the stevedore's
compensation carrier stands in the shoes of the employer, he "may at
all times intervene in courts of admiralty, if he has the equitable right to
the whole or any part of the damages. ' 2 3 Whether an employer or his
subrogated insurer can be compelled -to join in the litigation before any
statutory assignment of rights to them occurs is less clear. 234 According
to one commentator, however, the "cases that deny joinder of the
insurance carrier have been termed a minority, and it has been stated
that after Aetna [Life Insurance Co. v. Moses] 235 the weight of authority classifies the subrogated insurance carrier as a necessary
party. 12 36 Some courts have reached the intermediate result that while
237
it is not necessary to join the missing party, it is permissible.
Such a result is eminently reasonable. Permitting joinder in such
cases is the "obvious way to see that everyone's interests are watched
over." 238 This is particularly true where both the longshoreman and
2 39
stevedore seek their recoveries through the same cause of action.
As the Aetna Court said, "both 'are interested in the recovery,' which
240
is obviously true.2
231. See Gorman, supra note 8, at 21.
232. See The Etna, 138 F.2d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1943).
233. Id. at 42, quoting from The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 152 (1854).
234. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 74.41, at 14-253 and cases cited therein.
235. 287 U.S. 530 (1933).
236. 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.09 [2.-3], at 359 (2d ed. 1967). See
the cases collected id. n.4.
237. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 152 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.
1945); Moore v. Hechinger, 127 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
238. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 74.16, at 14-193. Similarly, "[i]t is generally
held that where two parties are entitled to a portion of the proceeds of a third party
recovery, both may and sometimes must be joined as co-plaintiffs." E. BLAIR, REFERENCE GUIDE TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 24:03, at 24-11 n.9 (1974).
239. E. BLAIR, supra note 238, § 24:03 at 24-12.
240. Moore v. Hechinger, 127 F.2d 746, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1942), quoting from Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530, 543 (1933). It is important to recognize that
the joinder advocated herein is completely different from an impleading under FED. R.
Civ. P. 14 seeking indemnity. While the latter seeks to hold the stevedore liable for
damages owed by the shipowner, the former merely seeks to adjust repayment of
compensation to the stevedore in an equitable fashion.
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The trend in admiralty mirrors that in other areas. In Joyner v.
F & B Enterprises, Inc.,"' the District of Columbia Circuit denied a
third party's motion for joinder of the plaintiff's employer under Rule
17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "on the ground that an
employer who pays compensation without an award lacks a substantive
right to sue a third party for reimbursement of benefits paid. '242 The
Fifth Circuit, however, recently found Joyner inconsistent 243 with the
Supreme Court's decision in FederalMarine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside
Shipping Co.2 44 Burnside had held that an employer, in addition to any
right he might have to reimbursement under the LHWCA, had a
common law right to recover its compensation payments as damages
from a shipowner resulting from breach of the vessel's duty to provide
the stevedore a safe place to work.2 41 Nothing in the 1972 amendments
to the LHWCA removed that right.24 6
Under authority of Burnside, the Second Circuit recently denied
joinder of a stevedore's insurer in Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co." 7 The
shipowner had moved to join the insurer "as a necessary party plaintiff
pursuant to Rule 19(a). 248 In deciding that joinder was improper,
-the court assumed that a Burnside claim could only arise after a
determination "that the compensation payments exceed the plaintiff's
recovery. '2 49 That assumption is counter to the Fifth Circuit's recent
25 0
analysis of Burnside in Louviere v. Shell Oil Co.
Without deciding the real import of Burnside, the Second Circuit
in Landon could have determined the propriety of joinder by examining
the interests of the parties to the litigation. The court categorized the
241. 448 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
242. Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1975), construin.q
Joyner, supra note 241.
243. Id. at 282.
244. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
245. Id. at 410-12. For a detailed discussion of Burnside, see generally 2 A.
LARSON, supra note 1, § 77.
246. See Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1975). But see
Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 761 (2d Cir. 1975) (suggesting that
Burnside may not have survived the 1972 amendments).
247. 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975). The duty to provide its stevedore with a safe
place to work is different from the pre-amendment non-delegable duty to provide longshoremen a safe place to work, and in all probability it has survived the amendments.
Thus, if cargo is damaged because of unsafe conditions on board its vessel, or if a
stevedore's equipment is thereby damaged, liability will rest with the vessel. On the
other hand, however, it is believed that with regard to cargo claims, stevedores still
warrant to shipowners that they will do their job in a workmanlike manner. Thus, if
the stevedore's carelessness causes damage to cargo, it will presumably be liable for
breach of its warranty.
248. Id. at 758.
249. Id. at 761.
250. 509 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1975).
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insurer's interest as "not in the litigation between the plaintiff and
ship, but only in the plaintiff's recovery." '21 This totally ignores the
equitable right of the insurer to a portion of the plaintiff's recovery.
In effect, the longshoreman brings not one action, but two: one for his
own benefit and one for the use of his employer's subrogated insurer.
This fact of life has been recognized by other courts. Poleski v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. 252 held that since the longshoreman had

a duty to reimburse his employer's insurer out of his recovery, the
"carrier is therefore a party for whose benefit such an action is brought.
By paying compensation or medical expenses without an award a
carrier foregoes only its right to control the employee's right of action
against the third person .... It may be joined as a plaintiff or as a use
plaintiff. 2 5 3 Thus, in effect, the court found that "both insured and

'2 4
insurer 'own' portions of the substantive right.
The Poleski decision retains vitality today. Based on its authority,
joinder of the insurer was allowed in White v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.25
The application of the Equitable Credit under this theory was recently
illustrated in Frascav. Prudential-GraceLines.2" 6 Frasca brought suit
against Prudential-Grace "to his own use, and to the use of Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company," the insurer of Frasca's employer. After
the jury findings, 25 7 the trial judge stated: "The judgment, accordingly,
will be that Frank Frasca, to his own use, recover the sum of $8,400.00
with costs; and that Frank Frasca, for the use of Liberty Mutual,

recover nothing.

'25 8

This procedure recognizes the actual interests of

the parties and permits justice to be done within the framework of the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA. Because impleading the stevedore
under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is no longer
permitted after the 1972 amendments, the "use-plaintiff" concept may
be expected to have increased appeal.
B.

The Nature of the Right the Stevedore Seeks to Protect
A stevedore obtains a statutory lien only when it pays compensation

"under an award.

'259

Otherwise, repayment is obtained "through ap-

251.

521 F.2d at 761.
252. 21 F.R.D. 579 (D. Md. 1958).

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.
1975 A.M.C. 191 (D. Md. 1974).
394 F. Supp. 1092, 1975 A.M.C. 1136 (D. Md. 1975).
1975 A.M.C. at 1144.
1975 A.M.C. at 1145.
33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1970).
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plication of the equitable doctrine of subrogation." 2 6° In determining
when reimbursement is allowed and when it should be denied, courts
have uniformly applied equitable principles, for such is the nature of
subrogation.2 6 ' Thus, courts sitting in admiralty have been able to
260. Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd sub
nom. Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1953).
261. See The Etna, 138 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1943). The equitable nature of the
lien has even been asserted on occasion by stevedores. See International Terminal
Operating Co. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 272 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 919 (1960). An excellent discussion of subrogation is found in Compania
Anonima Venezolana De Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692 (5th
Cir. 1962) :
This takes us to the very fundamentals of subrogation. It is now a mechanism
so universally applied in new and unknown circumstances that it is easy to overlook that it originates in equity. Every facet, whether substantive or procedural,
is controlled by the equitable origin and aim of subrogation. These principles, so
well established that to cite cases would be an affectation, find expression in
accepted texts, as the following excerpts reflect. "Legal subrogation is a creature
of equity not depending upon contract, but upon the equities of the parties." 50
Am. Jur. Subrogation § at 679. Through it equity seeks "* * * to prevent the
unearned enrichment of one party at the expense of another * * *." § 4 at 681.
It has "for its purpose the working out of an equitable adjustment and the doing
of complete and perfect justice between the parties by securing the ultimate discharge of a debt by the person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay
it, and preventing the sweeping away of the fund from which in good conscience
the creditor ought to be paid." § 6 at 683-84. It has been "characterized as an
eminently just doctrine, a pure, unmixed equity, one of the benevolences of the
law, created, fostered, and enforced in the interest and for the promotion of equity
and justice, and to prevent injustice." § at 685. Applied as it now is, "it is
broad enough to include every instance in which one person, not acting as a mere
volunteer or intruder, pays a debt for which another is primarily liable, and which
in equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the latter." § 7
at 686. It is "a consequence which equity attaches to certain conditions. It is not
an absolute right, but one which depends upon the equities and attending facts and
circumstances of each case." § 10 at 688. Because its object is "to do complete
and perfect justice between the parties without regard to form or technicality, the
remedy will be applied in all cases where demanded by the dictates of equity, good
conscience, and public policy. Consequently, relief by way of subrogation will not
be granted where it would work injustice or where innocent persons would suffer,
or where the result would be inimical to a sound public policy." § 11 at 690. As
"subrogation is administered upon equitable principles, it is only where an applicant has an equity to invoke that the courts will interfere. Moreover, the equity
of the party seeking subrogation must be strong and his rights clear, and his equity
must be superior to that of other claimants." § 12 at 690-91. And it "will not be
enforced to the prejudice of other rights of equal or higher rank, or to displace
an intervening right or title, or to overthrow the equity of another person." § 13
at 691-92. Subrogation "is not an absolute right which a party paying the debt
of another may enforce at will, but rather, a matter of grace to be granted or
withheld as the equities of the case may demand." § 16 at 693. The whole aim
of subrogation "is the doing of equity and justice, and the relief will not be decreed
where it will work an injustice, and so it cannot be invoked to the injury of
innocent third persons." § 17 at 693.
Id. at 697.
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avoid any fundamental unfairness in making the parties to longshoring
cases whole.2 0 2 Stevedoring interests are not prejudiced, for they have
ample opportunity to present their equities before the court.
In some cases, legal principles are applied in determining the right
to recoup compensation payments. For example, the subrogee's negligence has been asserted as a defense to his claim. 263 More often, how-

ever, courts think in terms of such equitable notions as unclean hands:
if an insurer or his insured is unworthy, he should not obtain a recovery. 4 To allow a negligent employer to hide his fault behind a
mask of subrogation would subvert -the equitable principles which
prompted its creation. Thus, courts have denied full subrogation in a
variety of circumstances. 265 The North Carolina rule succinctly states
the employer's situation: "[H]is hands ought not to have the blood of
the dead or injured workman upon them, when he thus invokes the impartial powers and processes of law."2 6
The failure of some to recognize the distinction between legal and
equitable rights is apparent from their assertions that any reduction in
the stevedore's recovery of its lien constitutes "indirect liability," which
is forbidden by the amendments. 2 6 7 Such reasoning, which was central
to the rejection of credit defenses in Hubbardv. Great Pacific Shipping
262. See United States Lines v. Jarka Corp., 387 F.2d 436, 437 (1st Cir. 1967).
263. See Note, Workmen's Compensation: Should a Contributorily Negligent
Employer be Subrogated., 42 IND. L.J. 430, 431 (1967).

264. See id. at 434-35; 33

NOTRE DAME LAW.

506, 507 (1958).

265. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Oosting, 456 F.2d 956 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 980 (1972), was an action by a stevedore and its subrogated insurer to
recover its lien from a longshoreman's third-party judgment before a payment of fees
to the plaintiff's attorney. Since the interests of the longshoreman and the stevedore
had been conflicting and the stevedore had consequently attempted to defeat the longshoreman's recovery, it was held that the insurer could obtain reimbursement only for
the plaintiff's net recovery, the amount remaining after payment of costs and attorneys' fees. Obviously, the court thought it unfair to allow the stevedore to recoup
statutory expenditures from a fund which it made every effort to diminish.
266. Brown v. Southern Ry., 204 N.C. 668, 671, 169 S.E. 419, 420 (1933). See
Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 71, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377, 366 P.2d 641, 649 (1961) ;
Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 668, 73 S.E.2d 886, 891-92 (1953). Based on these
considerations of preventing inequities, one judge viewed the role of admiralty courts
expansively: "The Chancellor is no longer fixed to the woolsack. He may stride the
quarter-deck of maritime jurisprudence and, in the role of admiralty judge, dispense,
as would his landlocked brother, that which equity and good conscience impels." Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegcion v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692, 699
(5th Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted).
267. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
See Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975) (even the payment of
compensation amounted to the type of indemnity which the amendments sought to end)

1976]

407

THE EQUITABLE CREDIT

Co., Monrovia,2 6 8 was effectively criticized in Croshaw v. Koninklijke
Nediloyd, B. V. Rijswijk :211

The indirect liability proscribed by Section 905 (b) concerned legal
rights and remedies. Congress drafted that proscription in order
to eliminate indemnity actions and warranty provisions which had
been exposing stevedores to liability for personal injury awards
based on the shipowner's negligence or the "unseaworthiness" of
his vessel. Legislative history does not reveal whether Congress
intended to protect the stevedore's equitable lien from his own
negligent conduct as well. Such protection does not appear justified
and would clearly violate fundamental principles of equity.
. . . There is no equity in the principle that a stevedore
should be allowed to enforce an unmitigated lien on a personal
injury judgment which has been reduced because of the stevedore's
equitable, it must be
concurrent negligence. If his lien is to be 2truly
°
diminished according to that negligence.
Because the Equitable Credit brings the stevedore or his insurer
into the litigation only to determine what portion of its compensation
lien, if any, should be refunded from the third-party recovery, it is fully
consistent with the goal of the 1972 amendments to reduce tripartite
litigation. Furthermore, it is manifestly proper under the equitable
principles associated with subrogation. As will shortly be seen, application of the Equitable Credit will serve to advance, -not retard, the
most basic purpose of the LHWCA.
VIII.

FURTHERING THE LEGISLATURE'S

ECONOMIC

SOCIAL AND

POLICIES

Legislation may be characterized as a response by a group of
individuals representing the public to a situation which they feel is
intolerable. When basic public policy and values are offended, new
duties will be structured to bring the deviant practice back within
accepted norms. Such a process occurred during passage of the 1972
amendments to the LHWCA. Congress determined that longshoremen
and other harbor workers were subject to frequent and severe injury,
and that the compensation and risk distribution systems were not
satisfactory to protect these workers. Thus, two primary goals were
evidenced: elimination of as many of these accidental injuries as possible
and, when they inevitably occur, compensation of the injured worker
in an amount ample to insure his continued economic well-being.
268. 1975 A.M.C. 1518 (D. Ore. 1975).
269. 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975).
270. Id. at 1233-34.

408

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

(VOL.

35

Congress intended to fulfill these goals through the creation or
retention of two basic duties. First, the stevedore, employer of the
.injured longshoreman, would be required to pay compensation in the
'event of a work-related injury, regardless of fault. By raising compensation benefits substantially and providing an annual adjustment as a
hedge on inflation, 27 1 Congress achieved its goal of economic protection.
'At the same time, the safety objective was promoted, for a stevedore
could decrease its insurance premiums for workmen's compensation only
by taking preventive action to reduce the number of claims. Secondly,
shipowners were to be held liable when their negligence was a cause
of the accident. Such third-party recoveries could only improve the
worker's financial situation and would serve as an incentive to shipowners to adopt their own safety programs. Any analysis of the
LHWCA and the procedures available for relief thereunder must keep
in mind these primary duties and the policy considerations responsible
for their initiation.
As a corollary to these duties, a right is granted to longshoremen
and harbor workers to receive compensation from their employers and
to expect certain standards of conduct from shipowners. When these
rights are infringed, remedial devices are available. If compensation
is not paid, a claim may be filed against the employer. 2 If the breach
of duty of a third party is a cause of his injury, the employee may also
bring an action against such third party.27 3 Note, however, what happens when a worker's third party recovery is used to repay his concurrently negligent employer. Effectively, he is not denied his monetary
remedy, for otherwise he would obtain a double recovery. He is,
however, stripped of his right to recover compensation. Because that
right was afforded to further the congressional purpose of providing
incentives to employers to follow strict rules for on-the-job safety,
the worker has lost something of value. His rights against his employer are arbitrarily scuttled in favor of his rights against a third party.
In the shuffle, safety objectives are lost. 27 4

While no financial loss

results, most workers would undoubtedly agree that being injured and
271. 33 U.S.C. § 910(f) (Supp. II, 1972).
272. Id. § 913 (Supp. II, 1972).
273. Id. § 933 (Supp. II, 1972).
274. It is doubtful whether safety programs initiated by stevedores owe their
creation solely to altruistic motivation. Workmen's compensation insurance is a cost
of doing business, and to the extent that safety programs produce positive results
from an actuarial standpoint, a real saving has been effected. However, if negligent
stevedores obtain reimbursement of compensation paid whenever a third party is
jointly negligent, their incentive to maintain stringent safety programs will be seriously undermined.
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then being made whole is never as satisfactory as never being injured
in the first place.
Arguably, what is advocated herein is recovery for moral fault,
and indeed that is true. Certainly one is not always provided a remedy
for injuries attributable to the moral wrongs of another. Quite clearly
Congress could have decided that social policy would best be advanced
by allowing employers to recover the entire amount of compensation
benefits advanced by them to a worker without regard to the employer's
fault, either absolutely or comparatively. Congress, however, stopped
short of such a drastic step. Instead, the policy reasons for preventing
stevedores from absolving themselves completely were carefully spelled
out:
It is important to note that adequate workmen's compensation
benefits are not only essential to meeting the needs of the injured
employee and his family, but, by assuring that the employer bears
the cost of unsafe conditions, serves to strengthen the employer's
2 75
incentive to provide the fullest measure of on-the-job safety.
Some courts have specifically recognized the existence of these
policy considerations in attempting to distribute liability equitably under
the LHWCA.2 7

1

As the stevedore and the shipowner are in equally

277
good positions to distribute the risk among users of the service,
there is no reason to exclude stevedores from shouldering a portion of
the liability when to do so would contravene the safety objectives of
the Act. Few longshoring accidents occur outside of the scope of the
work -that stevedores are hired specifically to do.2 78 In assigning fault
in these accidents, it has long been a policy of admiralty to promote

275.

HOUSE REPORT,

supra note 14, at 1, U.S.

CODE CONG. &

AD.

NEWS,

92d Cong.,

at 4699.
276. For example, Judge Pettine discussed the effect of "open-ended contribution"
on "the social and economic policies underlying the compensation scheme" in Newport
Air Park, Ins. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. R.I. 1968), rev'd, 419 F2d
342 (lst Cir. 1969).
277. See McCoid, supra note 125, at 444. If anything, stevedores can distribute the
risk more effectively than shipowners. When the risk is distributed by a stevedore, all
shipowners using that stevedore will share the burden through the stevedore's fee,
later passing it on themselves in freight charges. When shipowners must distribute
the loss directly, one level of distribution is eliminated.
278. Dennis Lindsay, an attorney representing the West Coast Stevedoring Association and the National Maritime Compensation Committee, so testified before the
Senate Subcommittee conducting hearings on the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA:
"You are well aware that vessel's gear failures and the like only are 1 percent of all
accidents. Most accidents are a result of housekeeping of the stevedore by its men
during the whole work operation .

.

. ."

Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 654.
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safety by "placing the burden ultimately on the company whose default
caused the injury." '79 '
One final and persuasive argument also rests on the very foundations of social policy. When a longshoreman is injured, whether with
or without any fault on the part of his employer, the stevedore must
nonetheless provide benefits under the LHWCA. When, however, a
third party's negligence also contributes, the employer, in the absence of
a credit, will recover all or most of his compensation payments. This
creates an anomaly. The employer is better off when both he and a
third party are negligent than when no one is negligent. Such a result
has been strongly criticized on humanitarian grounds:
Recognizing the necessity of those socio-economic contingencies
which stimulate business, it is clear that regardless of negligence
no one should be allowed to benefit from the -injury or death of
another human being. This is a truism: a philosophical and
religious concept as well as a basic maxim of law.mo
IX.

CONCLUSION

Workmen's compensation is a system designed to support injured
workers during their period of disability. Third-party actions in the
context of a workmen's compensation setting are not punitive in nature.
By holding negligent third parties liable, courts are able to encourage
them to maintain more stringent safety standards, while providing a
bonus for the injured worker. These ideals are advanced sufficiently,
however, by holding third parties liable only for those damages caused
by the third-party's proportionate fault.
In tort litigation, most courts have felt compelled to grant total
victory to one side or the other. Fortunately, courts sitting in admiralty
have felt free to adopt more enlightened rules, based on notions of
equity and fundamental fairness. Recently in the area of personal injury
to longshoremen and harbor workers, Congress, by the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, ended the era of Sieracki, Ryan, and their
progeny which had shifted total victory back and forth without entertaining the possibility of compromise.
279. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315, 324 (1964). This concept was compared before the Senate Subcommittee with the
notion in criminal law that "[p]unishment is a deterrent to crime. If there is any
merit in this proposition, then there is certainly merit in the proposition that making
the wrongdoer and his defective appliances bear the cost of the 'human misery' produced thereby is a deterrent to the carelessness and to his supplying defective equipment." Statement of David B. Kaplan, Chairman of the Admiralty Section of the
American Trial Lawyers Association. Senate Hearings,supra note 71, at 377.
280. McCarthy, supra note 129, at 148.

1976] ,.

THE EQUITABLE CREDIT

An opportunity now exists for admiralty to foster a new set of
rules for apportioning fault in third-party cases which could provide
the guidelines for reform throughout the field of workmen's compensation. The employer-employee relationship does not consider fault;
employee negligence is not a bar to the recovery of compensation payments. However, once a third party is brought into the picture, fault
concepts emerge. A third party cannot be held liable unless he is at
fault. A third party cannot be held liable for those damages caused by
'the fault of the injured worker himself. Because negligent employers
are permitted to escape sole liability under the compensation act when
a negligent third party is involved, justice is furthered by allowing
those third parties similarly to escape sole liability when their fault
was only a partial cause of the worker's injury.
This article has analyzed a series of rules for apportioning liability,
now known as the Equitable Credit, which are believed to constitute
'the fairest method available for determining the proper liability of
shipowners and stevedores in the longshoring personal injury setting.
Their adoption by the courts at this time would advance the present
'trend of the Supreme Court in apportioning damages in admiralty and
will provide the incentive for a whole new era of growth throughout
the field of workmen's compensation.

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

(VOL.

35

ADDENDUM
On November 21, 1975, after preparationof this article had been
virtually completed, the Ninth Circuit issued opinions in the appeals
of Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 281 and Dodge v. Mitsui
Shintaku Ginko K.K., Tokyo,2 82 concerning the availability of credit
defenses to shipowners. In both cases, credit defenses were disallowed
and the defendant shipowners were ordered to pay the entire damage
award of each longshoreman. From the proceeds of such judgments,
the longshoremen were required in turn to repay the liens of their
employers' workmen's compensation insurers. Thus, the stevedoring
companies ultimately avoided any financial loss whatsoever, notwithstanding the findings of the Shellman 281 and Dodge2 4 trial courts of
seventy percent and fifty percent stevedore negligence respectively.
Unfortunately, the opinions are uninformative, neither providing
a particularly coherent or succinct analysis of the non-credit viewpoint
nor attempting to analyze the reasons advanced for adoption of a credit.
Rather, the Shellman opinion, without bothering to deal analytically
with the decision below, is based on the theories, largely unsupported
and unexplained, that a longshoreman is always "entitled to recover
the full amount of his damages,"28 5 and that credit defenses constitute an
"'unjustified burden upon the injured longshoreman"28 ' and "would
shift the inequity from shipowner to injured longshoreman.""' Apparently overlooked is the fact that, in the absence of vessel negligence,
longshoremen are limited to compensation payments even when their
employers undeniably have been negligent. While not criticizing this
result, the court, by some logical tour de force not evidenced in the
opinion, found it grossly unfair to prevent an injured longshoreman
from recovering his entire judgment from a concurrently negligent
shipowner, even though the shipowner's negligence might have been
only one percent responsible for the longshoreman's injuries. If, as
the Ninth Circuit suggests, fairness to the parties is the controlling
consideration, the results reached in the Shellman and Dodge appeals
are unsupportable.
Perhaps the Shellman panel sensed the inherent weakness in its
argument, for it ultimately fell back on the comforting advice in Halcyon
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Civil No. 75-3071 (9th Cir., Nov. 21, 1975).
Civil No. 75-1442 (9th Cir., Nov. 21, 1975).
1975 A.M.C. 367 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
1975 A.M.C. 1505 (D. Ore. 1974).
Civil No. 75--3071, Slip op. at 6.
Id. at 7.

287. Id. at 8.
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Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp."'8 that "it is for Congress and not for the courts to create a solution to this problem. ' 2

9

However valid that propositionwas when voiced in Halcyon, the failure
of the Ninth Circuit to discuss it in light of the recent congressional
decision to leave resolution of the joint-fault dilemma to the courts
290
is disturbing.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Dodge, rendered by the same panel
which heard Shellman, also relied largely on Halcyon. The Dodge
opinion, however, based its holding substantially on the premise that
any credit would, in effect, constitute the sort of contribution prohibited in Halcyon. 29 ' Furthermore, the court ruled that because any
reduction in the stevedore's lien recovery would be another form of
contribution, it made no difference whether the lien was legal or
equitable.29 2
It can only be hoped that future opinions in this area, regardless
of their outcome, will address themselves fully to all arguments on
both sides of the issues.
288. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
289. Slip op. at 8-9. See the criticism of this philosophy, notes 187-88 and accompanying text supra.
290. See text accompanying notes 91-92, supra.
291. Civil No. 75-1442, Slip op. at 2-4. The distinction between contribution and
the Equitable Credit, which the Ninth Circuit either did not understand or simply
chose to ignore, is explained fully at notes 209-25 and accompanying text supra.
292. Id. at 7. The equitable nature of the lien is discussed at notes 259-70 and
accompanying text supra.

